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LIMITATIONS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

"OF

William Wirt Blume* and B.

J. George, Jr.t

the time of commencing civil actions" was the second title of
Part II of the Code of Procedure proposed by David Dudley
Field and his co-commissioners in 1848. The reason for including time
limitations in a code of procedure was stated by the commissioners in
their first report: 1
"Their introduction in this place is rendered necessary, by the
fact, that the existing limitations of actions, ( with the exception of
those relating to real property,) depend upon the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and between the several
forms of actions at law. To carry into effect, therefore, the abolition of those distinctions, it becomes necessary to revise the statute
of limitations, and to adapt it to the substance, instead of the form,
of the remedy."
When similar reforms for the federal courts became effective in 1938
as a result of the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure no attempt
was made to provide time limitations for the commencement of civil
actions. To have done so would have meant the adoption of a federal
statute of limitations applicable to all actions commenced in, or removed to, the federal courts. Such a statute would have created differences in time limitations between state and federal courts, and would
have led to evils of the type sought to be avoided by the Supreme Court
by its decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins (1938). 2 One great objective
of the Rules of Civil Procedure was to provide a uniform procedure for
all the federal district courts without regard to the procedure of the
states in which the courts were held. The great objective of the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins was to provide uniformity of result
within a particular state in actions involving state-created rights. The
implementation of these great objectives in the same year marks 1938
as the beginning of a new period in the history of the federal courts.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
t Associate Editor, Student Editorial Board, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
1 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS
2

304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).

92 (1848).
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I
APPLICABILITY OF STATE STATUTES TO FEDERAL CASES

A. Under Rules of Decision Act before 1938
1. Actions at Law
Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided "that the
laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply." 3 That this section Clater
known as the Rules of Decision Act) 4 was intended to apply to matters
of substantive law and not to procedure is clearly shown by the fact that
Congress the same year enacted another statute5 (known as the Process
Act) which provided that the "forms of writs and executions" and the
"mo des of process"·m "smts
· at common law" sh ouldb e the same m
· each
state respectively as then "used or allowed in the supreme courts of the
same" except as otherwise provided by federal statute. The "forms and
modes of proceedings" in equity and admiralty were to be "according to
the course of the civil law." This act was extended in 1790,6 and again
in 1791.7 In 1792 the act was amended8 to provide that "the forms of
writs, executions and other process" and "the forms and modes of proceeding in suits at common law" should be the same "as are now used"
in the courts mentioned in the act of 1789. The "forms and modes of
proceeding" in equity and admiralty were to be "according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts
of admiralty respectively." It was further provided that the prescribed
practice might be altered by rule of court. The act of 1792 applied only
to the original thirteen states. Federal courts sitting in states admitted
after that time usually followed state practice in law actions, but were
not required to do so.9 In 1828 the act was amended10 to make it applicable to federal courts held in states admitted into the Union since
1789. The "forms and modes of proceeding" in actions at law were to
be same as then used in the highest state court of original jurisdiction.
a 1 Stat. L. 73, 92.
4 Now §1652, tit. 28, U.S.C. (1948).
5 1 Stat. L. 93.
6 1 Stat. L. 122.
7 1 Stat. L. 191.
s 1 Stat. L. 276.
9Warren, ''Federal Process and State Legislation," 16 VA. L. R:sv. 421 at 436 (1930).
10 4 Stat. L. 278
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Since this act applied only to states then existing, the act was amended
in 184211 to make it applicable to states admitted after 1828. After
1842 it was the practice to insert in each act admitting a state to the
Union a provision making the laws of the United States, not locally
inapplicable, effective within that state.12 "Legal effect of that provision
was, that the Process Act of the nineteenth of May, 1828, became applicable in the Federal courts of that State."13 The "forms and modes
of proceeding" in actions at law "were such as were used in the highest
court of original jurisdiction of the State at the time of its admission into
the Union."14 Finally, in 1872, Congress got away from the old scheme
of requiring conformity with state practice of some fixed, and often remote, time, by providing that the "practice, pleadings, and forms and
modes of proceeding in other than equity and admiralty causes in the
circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform, as near as
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
. existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State
within which such circuit or district courts are held."15 The Conformity
Act of 1872 continued in effect until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938.16
a. Rights created by federal statutes. Federal statutes creating
substantive rights have been of two types: (1) Statutes creating substantive rights and at the same time placing time limitations on the
enforcement of the rights created. (2) Statutes creating substantive
rights without placing special time limitations on the enforcement of
the rights created. Actions involving statutes of the first type caused
little trouble. It was clear that the time limitations prescribed by the
federal statutes, and not those prescribed by statutes of the state in
which the federal court was sitting, should be applied. In the absence
of federal time limitations federal courts were faced with the choice
of applying state statutes of limitations or getting along without statutory time limitations of any kind. This problem was considered by the
Supreme Court in McCluny 11. Silliman (1830),1 7 and the conclusion
reached that a federal court in an action brought to enforce a right
arising under federal law should, where no special time limitation had
lI 5 Stat. L. 499
12Warren, "Federal Process and State Legislation," 16 VA. L. REv. 421 at 445 (1930).
13Clifford, J., in United States v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 514 at 516-17 (1867).
14 Gray, J., in Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693 at 695, 9 S.Ct. 690
(1889).
15 17 Stat. L. 197.
16 2 MooRB's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., 6 (1948).
11 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 269 at 275 (1830).
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been prescribed by federal law, apply the statute of limitations of the
state in which the federal court was sitting. After quoting section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, McLean, J., stated: "Under this statute,
the acts of limitations of the several states, where no special provision
has been made by Congress, form a rule of decision in the courts of
the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is given in the
state courts." The question involved in McCluny v. Silliman was reconsidered in Campbell v. Haverhill (Supreme Court, 1895),1 8 and
the same answer given. After quoting part of section 721 of the federal
Revised Statutes (Rules of Decision Act), Brown, J., stated: "That
this section embraces the statutes of limitations of the several states has
been decided by this court in a large number of cases."
b. Rights created by state statutes. At no time has Congress seen
fit to prescribe time limitations for actions brought in federal courts to
enforce state-created rights. In actions to enforce such rights state time
limitations have always been applied. Whenever a state statute creating
a right contained a special time limitation this limitation was considered
as a limitation of the right created by the statute, and was enforced
along with the rest of the statute by federal courts sitting in the same
or other states.19 The entire statute was a rule of decision under section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. If a state statute creating a right
did not contain a special time limitation, and there was no other state
statute expressly limiting actions on the right created,20 a federal court
enforcing the right applied the general statute of limitations of the state
in which the federal court was sitting.
c. Righ~ created by common law. There being no federal statute
of limitations applicable to common-law actions in general, the federal
courts from the beginning found it necessary to apply in such actions
the general statutes of the states. Authority for so doing was found in
the Rules of Decision Act (section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
When the action was brought in a federal court sitting in the state in
which the cause of action arose, the federal court had no choice but to
18155 U.S. 610, 15 S.Ct. 217 (1895).
19Jn Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692 (1904), Holmes, J., stated at 454:
"Ordinary limitations of actions are treated as laws of procedure and as belonging to the
lex fori, as affecting the remedy only and not the right. But in cases where it has been
possible to escape from that qualification by a reasonable distinction courts have been willing
to treat limitations of time as standing like other limitations and cutting down the defendant's liability wherever he is sued. The common case is where a statute creates a new liability and in the same section or in the same act limits the time within which it can be enforced,
whether using words of condition or not."
2 0 See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692 (1904).
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apply the statute of limitations of that state. When the action was
brought in a federal court sitting in another state, the federal court had
to decide whether to apply the statute of limitations of the state in which
the cause arose or that of the state in which .the federal court was sitting.
This problem was considered at length by Story, J., on circuit in LeRoy
v. Crowninshield (1820) 21 and the conclusion reached that a commonlaw action brought in a federal court on a cause of action arising in another state was governed by the statute of limitations of the state in
which the federal court was sitting. The view that a general statute of
limitations should be classified as remedial for the purpose of applying
the law of the forum was adopted by the Supreme Court in McElmoyle
v. Cohen (1839),22 and reaffirmed by that Court after full consideration in Townsend v. Jemison (1850). 23 In Hawkins v. Barney (Supreme Court, 1831)24 Johnson, J., recognized as "unquestionably true"
an argument that "limitation laws, although belonging to the lex fori,
and applying immediately to the remedy, yet indirectly they effect a
complete divesture and even transfer of right." This view explains
how the federal courts could say that a general statute of limitations was
the law of the forum, and at the same time say that such a statute was a
rule of decision under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Such a statute was
procedural in the sense that it directly affected the remedy. It was substantive in the sense that it indirectly affected the right.
d. Interpretation of state statutes. In applying state statutes of
limitations the federal courts followed interpretations of the statutes
given by the highest courts of the states. In a consideration of this
problem in Bauserman v. Blunt (Supreme Court, 1893),25 Gray, J.,
after quoting the Rules of Decision Act, stated: "No laws of the several
States have been more steadfastly or more often recognized by this
court, from the beginning, as rules of decision in the courts of the
United States, than statutes of limitations of actions, real and personal,
as enacted by the legislature of a State, and as construed by its highest
court."
e. Commencement provisions of state statutes. Statutes of limitations of some of the states contained provisions declaring when an action
should be deemed commenced for the purpose of stopping the running
Mason 151 (1820).
13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 311 (1839).
23 9 How. (50 U.S.) 406 (1850).
24 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 457 at 466 (1831).
25 147 U.S. 647, 13 S.Ct. 466 (1893).
212
22
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of a time limitation. A question arose as to whether a federal C01:Ift in
applying such a statute should, under the Rules of Decision Act, apply
the commencement provision along with the rest of the statute. This
question was answered in the affirmative in Michigan Insurance Bank
v. Eldred (Supreme Court, 1889).26 The commencement provision in
question had been enacted after the state had been admitted to the
Union, and, therefore, could not be applied under the Process Act of
1828.27 The provision could not be applied under the Conformity Act
of 1872, that act not being in force when the cause of action arose.
After noting briefly that the Process Act of 1828 and the Conformity Act of 1872 were not applicable, Gray, J., stated: "But it has
been settled by a series of decisions of this court that statutes of limitations, even in personal actions, including actions on judgments, were
'laws of the several States' which, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise required or provided,
must, under the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, §34, 'be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of
the United States in cases where they apply.' " 28 After the Conformity
Act of 1872 became effective there was little or no occasion for determining whether a commencement provision of a state statute of limitations
was procedural, and therefore should be applied under the Conformity
Act, or was an integral part of the statute, and therefore should be applied under the Rules of Decision Act. If not applicable under the one
statute it was applicable under the other.

2. Suits in Equity
Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, which directed that
the "laws of the several states" should be regarded as "rules of decision"
in the courts of the United States, was expressly limited to "trials at common law."29 The conformity provisions of the various p:(ocess acts30
were also limited to actions at law, as was the general Conformity Act
26 130 U.S. 693, 9 S.Ct. 690 (1889).
27 Supra at note 14.
2 8 130 U.S. 693 at 696. Referring to

the state statute of limitations Gray, J., stated
at 697: ~The legal construction and effect of §27 of c. 138, taken in connection with the preceding sections of the same chapter, is that the service of the summons, or its delivery to an
officer with intent that it shall be served, is the act by which the period of limitation must
be computed; and the definition of that act is an integral part of the statute of limitations,
and as such applicable, as the rest of the statute undoubtedly is, to actions in the courts of
the United States."
29 1 Stat. L. 73, 92.
ao 1 Stat. L. 93, 122, 191, 276; 4 Stat. L. 278; 5 Stat. L. 499.

1951]

LIMITATIONS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

943

of 1872.31 The Process Act of 178932 provided that "the forms and
modes of proceeding in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil law" or, as
amended in 1792,33 "according to the principles, rules and usages which
belong to courts of equity and courts of admiralty respectively." From
these and other statutes it seems that Congress did not intend or expect
the federal courts to apply state law-substantive or procedural-in
equity cases.
While not bound by any act of Congress to apply state statutes of
limitations to equity cases, the federal courts gradually developed a set
of rules which required, or went far towards requiring, the application
of state limitations statutes in the following situations: (1) Where a
state statute expressly provided a time limitation for the particular type
of suit in equity. (2) Where a state statute provided a time limitation
for an action at law, and the suit in equity was for a concurrent remedy.
(3)Where a state statute provided a time limitation for an action at law,
and the suit in equity was brought in aid of the action at law. ( 4)
Where a state statute provided a time limitation for an action at law,
and the suit in equity was analogous to the action at law. In other situations the doctrine of laches was applied. 34 It should be noted, however, that the federal courts did not always consider themselves "bound
to follow local statutes which in ordinary circumstances they could
adopt and apply by analogy."35 Due to this reservation of power to
apply the doctrine of laches in special situations, it is generally said that
the federal courts before 1938 were not bound by the state statutes of
limitations.
Under the Process Act of 1792 the "forms and modes of proceeding" in equity were to be "according to the principles, rules and usages
which belong to courts of equity" except as prescribed by federal statute
or court rule. 36 In 1822 the Supreme Court adopted a rule providing
that "in all cases where the rules prescribed by this court, or by the circuit court, do not apply, the practice of the circuit court shall be regulated by the practice of the high court of chancery in England."37 The
Equity Rules of 1822 regulated the service of process, but did not pre3117 Stat. L. 197.
32 1 Stat. L. 93.
33 1 Stat. L. 276
34 See analysis of early cases (opinion by Stone, J.) in Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280,
60 S.Ct. 527 (1940). Also see 2 MooRB's FEDERAL PRACTicB, 2d ed., 718 (1948).
3 5 Stone, J., in Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 at 288, 60 S.Ct. 527 (1940).
sa 1 Stat. L. 276.
37 7 Wheat. (20 U.S.) p. xxi (Rule XXXIII) (1822).
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scribe how a suit in equity should be commenced, or when such a suit
should be deemed commenced for the purpose of stopping the running
of a time limitation. The Rules did provide that a plaintiff should file
his bill "before or at the time of taking out the subpoena."38 Due to uncertainty as to when a suit in equity was considered commenced under
English chancery practice, and to the absence of a controlling federal
statute or court rule, the federal courts had considerable difficulty in
fixing the point of commencement of a suit in equity for the purpose of
stopping the running of a time limitation. In United States v. American Lumber Company (9th Cir. 1898)39 Gilbert, circuit judge, stated:
"Just at what point of time a suit in equity may be said to have
been begun under the practice of the. federal courts has not been
determined by any statute, or by any rule of court, or by any authoritative decision. A solution of the question must be found by
reference to the English chancery practice, which has been made
the rule of procedure in those courts."
After a review of the English practice, the origin of which was said to be
"involved in some obscurity," Judge Gilbert pointed out that it had been
"the interpretation of the English chancery practice," as the same had
been followed and applied by American state courts, "that a suit is begun, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, when the subpoena has been issued, provided that its issuance has been followed by a
bona fide effort to serve the same." In Linn & Lane Timber Company v.
United States (Supreme Court, 1915)40 Holmes, J., disposed of the
question with characteristic briefness as follows:
"The bills were filed and subpoenas were taken out and delivered to the Marshal for service before the statute had run, reasonable diligence was shown in getting service and therefore the rights
of the United States against all the patents were saved. For when
so followed up the rule is pretty well established that the statute is
interrupted by the filing of the bill."
According to this case it was the filing of the bill, and not the issuance
of the subpoena, which stopped the running of the statute.
In the first case mentioned above, the trial judge, sitting in Califomia,41 called attention to a section of the California Code of Civil
Procedure which provided that "an action is commenced ... when the
38 Id.

at p. xvii (Rule IV).

39 85 F. 827 at 829 (1898).
40 236 U.S. 574 at 578, 35 S.Ct.
41 Circuit Court, N.D. California

440 (1915).
(1897) 80 F. 309 at 315.
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complaint is filed." "But," he continued, "the procedure in equity in
the United States circuit courts is not controlled by state statutes; it is
entirely separate and independent of the equity rules and procedure
existing in the state tribunals." This case involved a time limi~tion
prescribed by a federal statute.42 Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants'
Refrigerating Co. (8th Cir. 1910)4 3 involved a time limitation prescribed by the state statute which created the right sought to be enforced. The federal trial judge applied the state time limitation as such,
but the court of appeals thought it should be applied by analogy. After
stating that under the English chancery practice as modified in the
United States, a suit in equity should be considered commenced from
the time of the filing of the bill, Sanborn, circuit judge, added:
"Now, even if the rule of the federal courts were that a suit
in equity was not commenced until the subpoena was issued, or
until it was served, yet since the analogous statute of limitations at
law, as interpreted by the courts in the state of Missouri which
enacted it, would not bar an action like this in hand in which the
petition was filed within, and the summons was issued and served
without, the 90 days, a national court in equity ought not to bar
such a suit under the circumstances of this case."
The court was not unaware of the fact that the Missouri view as to
when an action should be considered commenced was based on a section of the Missouri Code of Civil Procedure found in an article entitled: "The Manner of Commencing Suits, and the Service of Notices."44 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Schwartz (5th Cir.
1930)45 involved a time limitation contained in a contract of insurance.
The trial judge found that the suit had not been begun within the
limitation, citing a state statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that "a suit in equity is commenced when the bill is filed and process is
issued, where the process is subsequently served." As to the applicability of the state statute (citation not given) Foster, circuit judge, stated:
42 For another case involving a federal time limitation see United States v. Miller, (C.C.
Ore. 1908) 164 F. 444, in which Wolverton, district judge, said at 445: "It is suggested
that the commencement of a suit in equity in the federal court is governed by the local
statute for the commencement of actions within the state court; but such is not the rule.
The solution of the question when a suit is begun is to be sought wholly within equity
practice and procedure."
43 184 F. 199 at 207.
44 The court cited §566 of Missouri Revised Statutes 1899. This section is in Article
IV (''The Manner of Commencing Suits, and the Service of Notices").
45 42 F. (2d) 646 at 648.
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"The Conformity Act (28 USCA §724) has no application to
proceedings in equity in the federal courts, and therefore the statute of Florida cited by the District Court is also without effect, as
the limitation relied upon was created by the contract and not by
the law of Florida."
The views here expressed seem to conflict with those expressed in
Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., supra. Aside
from that case, it can be said in general that the federal courts did not
follow state law in determining when a suit in equity was deemed to
be commenced.46
B. Under Rules of Decision Act since 1938

1. Forms of Action
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) provides:
"There shall be one form of action known as 'civil action.'" Under this
rule it is not necessary or proper to label an action for legal relief as
anything other than a "civil action." Under the federal practice before
1938 it was necessary to label actions and suits as "at law" or "in
equity," and, in states which had not abolished the forms of action, to
label each action at law as being brought in a particular form of action.
In Williamson v. Columbia Gas & -Electric Corporation (3d Cir.
1939)47 the court was called on to apply a state statute providing time
limitations for certain "forms of action" to a "civil action" brought under
the federal rules on a claim arising under a federal statute. The state
statute provided: "No action of trespass, no action of replevin, no action
of debt not founded upon a record or specialty, no action of account, no
action of assumpsit, and no action upon the case shall be brought after
the expiration of three years from the accruing of the cause of action."
The first question was whether a state statute limiting "forms of action"
should be applied to a federal "civil action" brought under rules of procedure which had abolished the "forms of action." In answer to this
question, Maris, circuit judge, stated:
"We find no evidence in the Federal Rules of Civil P~ocedure
or in the notes thereto of an intent to cover the field of limitations
of actions. The state statutes accordingly remain applicable under
the Rules of Decision Act."
.
The next question was the manner of applying such a statute. As to
this Judge Maris stated:
46

47

See 2 MooRB's FEDERAL PRAcnCB, 2d ed., 733 (1948).
110 F. (2d) 15 at 20.
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"In order to apply a statute of limitations, such as that of Delaware, which reads in terms of common law actions, to a civil action
brought in a district court, it is necessary for the court through a
consideration of the nature of the cause of action disclosed in the
complaint to determine the form of action which would have been
brought upon it at common law."
Then came the complicated problem of determining whether the particular claim would have been sued on at common law in an action of
debt on a specialty, or in an action of trespass on the case. The consideration of this problem took the court back to Young and Ashhurnsham's Case (1587)4 8 and to other old cases dealing with the various
types of actions of debt, and the differences between actions of debt and
actions of trespass on the case.
When the forms of action were abolished in New York in 1848
the code commissioners recognized the importance of revising the statute of limitations "to adapt it to the substance, instead of the form, of
the remedy." 49 Now that the forms of action have been abolished for
federal courts sitting in states which have not effected this reform, it is
highly unfortunate that these courts, and the federal appellate courts,
must continue to apply statutes of limitations which refer to the form
of the action.50 Where, under the old practice, the plaintiff labeled his
action as being in a particular form, the application of such a statute
was not especially difficult.51 Under the present federal practice the
court must determine in what form or forms the particular action might
48 3 Leonard 161, 74 Eng. Rep. 606 (1587).
49 Supra at note I.
50 The common-law scheme of placing all claims

for relief in groups, and prescribing
a form of action for each group, is followed in Alabama (assumpsit, debt, detinue, ejectment,
trespass, trespass on the case, and trover), Maine (assumpsit, covenant, debt, detinue, replevin, trespass, trespass on the case, and trover), Maryland (assumpsit, detinue, ejectment,
replevin, trespass, trespass on the case, and trover), 1'\!1assachiisetts (contract, ejectment,
replevin, and tort), Michigan (assumpsit, ejectment, replevin, and trespass on the case),
New Hampshire (assumpsit, covenant, debt, detinue, ejectment, replevin, trespass, trespass
on the case, and trover), Pennsylvania (assumpsit, ejectment, replevin, and trespass), Rhode
Island (assumpsit, covenant, debt, detinue, ejectment, replevin, trespass, trespass on the
case, and trover), Tennessee (contract, detinue, ejectment, replevin, and tort "on the facts
of the case"), Vermont (contract, ejectment, replevin, and tort), Virginia (assumpsit, covenant, debt, detinue, ejectment, trespass, trespass on the case, and trover), and West Virginia
(assumpsit, covenant, debt, detinue, ejectment, trespass on the case, and trover). The general
statutes of limitations of the following states are geared in whole or in part to forms of action:
Colorado (assumpsit, case, debt, and replevin), Delmvare (writ of right), Maine (account,
assumpsit, case, debt, replevin, and trespass), Maryland (account, assumpsit, debt, detinue,
ejectment, replevin, and trespass), New Hampshire (debt and trespass), New Jersey (account,
case, covenant, debt, detinue, replevin, trespass, and trover), Pennsylvania (account, case,
debt, detinue, replevin, trespass q.c.f., and trover), Rhode Island (account, case, covenant,
.debt, detinue, replevin, and trespass), and Vermont (corttract and replevin).
51 See discussion in McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 269 at 277-8 (1830).
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have been brought. When it is recalled that in some situations the
plaintiff had a choice between or among two or more forms, the complexity of the problem is more apparent. "The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves."52

2. Union of Law and Equity
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) were made applicable
to procedure in the federal district courts "in all suits of a civil nature
whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity."53 This provision,
coupled with the one which provides there shall be "one form of
action,"54 had the effect of establishing one procedure for civil actions
whether for legal or equitable, or for legal and equitable, relief. The
adoption of the federal rules did not affect the application of state time
limitations, and, as we have seen, the federal courts continued, under
the Rules of Decision Act, to apply state statutes of limitations in actions
for legal relief. In actions for equitable relief an important change was
made. The Supreme Court in Erie R.R. 11. Tompkins (1938) 55 decided that state law-unwritten as well as written-must be applied by
federal courts in all cases except in matters governed by the constitution or statutes of the United States. This action was for legal relief,
and involved an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. A week
later, in Ruhlin 11. New York Life Insurance Co. (1938),56 the same·
doctrine was applied to a question of construction of a contract arising
in a suit in equity. In Russell 11. Todd (1940)57 the Supreme Court
declined to consider whether a federal court was required to apply a
state statute of limitations in a suit for equitaqle r~lief brought to enforce a right conferred by federal law. Stone, J., indicated that the
courts would, "without reference to the Rules of Decision Act," apply
such a statute "as a substitute or supplement for the equitable doctrine
of laches." In Guaranty Trust Co. 11. York (1945)58 the court held
that a federal court must apply a state statute of limitations in a suit for
equitable relief where jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citi52M,u~, EQUITY AND THE FoRMs oP Acrrr.oN 296 (1913). Cf. Salmond, 21 L. Q.
R:sv. 43 (1905): ''Forms of action are dead, but then: ghosts still haunt the precincts of the

law. In then: life they were powers of evil, and even in death they have not wholly ceased
from troubling."
53Rule 1.
54Rule2.
55 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
56 304 U.S. 202, 58 S.Ct. 860 (1938).
57 309 U.S. 280, 60 S.Ct. 527 (1940).
58 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945); 160 A.L.R. 1231. Noted in 44 MICH. L. R:sv.
477 (1945).
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zenship. Holmberg 11. Armbrecht (1946)59 involved a federally-created
right for which the sole remedy was in equity. The Supreme Court
held that the action was not controlled by the state statute of limitations;
that in such a case the federal court should apply its own views of the
doctrine of laches. Cope 11. Anderson (1947) 60 involved a federallycreated right, but the sole remedy was not in equity. In such a case,
according to Black, J., "equity will withhold its relief ... where the
applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy."
For the purpose of determining the applicability of state time limitations to actions in federal courts it is now necessary to classify all
such actions as follows:

I. Actions to enforce state-created rights.
2. Actions to enforce federally-created rights.
· a. Legal remedies.
b. Equitable remedies
c. Concurrent remedies.
An action to enforce a state-created right is now subject to the same time
limitations in a federal court as in a state court, and it is not necessary
to distinguish legal remedies from equitable remedies. This is as it
should be. Uniformity of result (the objective of Erie R.R. 11. Tompkins) is achieved, and procedural union of law and equity (an objective
of the Federal Rules) is made more nearly possible. An action to enforce a federally-created right is subject to the same time limitations in
a federal court as in a state court when the remedy is "legal" as distinguished from "equitable." This gives uniformity of result, but makes
it necessary to distinguish between legal and equitable remedies. When
the remedy sought in such a case is solely equitable the action is not
subject to the same time limitations in a federal court as in a state court,
except where the time limitations are £xed by federal statute. In the
absence of federal time limitations, state and federal courts may reach
different results in the same type of case. When the remedy may be
either legal or equitable, and the equitable remedy is sought because of
its greater procedural efficiency, the action is subject to the same time
limitations in a federal court as in a state court. Under this rule there
will be uniformity of result, but before the rule can be applied it must
appear that the equitable remedy sought is concurrent with one at law,
and not one available in equity alone.
rm 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582 (1946).
60 331

U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340 (1947).
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While it must be recognized that constitutional rights to jury trial
make it impossible, without constitutional amendments, to blot out
completely the historical distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity, the obstacles preventing complete union of legal and equitable procedure should be reduced to the constitutional minimum. The
elimination of the necessity of distinguishing between legal and equitable remedies in actions to enforce state-created rights, in order to
determine the applicability of state statutes of limitations, was a step
toward a more perfect union. It should be noted, however, that a federal court in dealing with a state-created right may be forced to apply
to a federal "ci01 action" a state statute of limitations which was drawn
to cover only certain actions at law. 61 It must determine whether the
federal action is "at law" within the statute or is "in equity" and therefore governed by the state doctrine of laches. So long as these distinctions remain in state statutes of limitations the federal courts will be
compelled to deal with them in civil actions brought to enforce statecreated rights.

. of"C ause ofA ction
. ""A
; rose""A
; ccrue"
3. M eanmg
State statutes of limitations commonly provide that certain actions
must be commenced within specified years from the time the "cause of
action" shall "accrue." And many have provisions for applying the time
limitations of the state or country where the "cause of action" "arose."
The common-law term "cause of action" was employed in the New
York Code of Procedure (1848), and in similar codes of other states, to
describe the chief procedural unit of the code civil action. The term
was not defined by the codes, and serious questions arose as to its proper
definition. Some of the confusion disappeared when it was recognized
that a legal term may properly be defined one way for one purpose, and
another way for another purpose. It is now recognized that the term
"cause of action" may be defined one way for determining where a
cause of action arose; another way for determining when a cause of
action accrued; and still another way for determining whether two
pleadings refer to the same cause of action. The same is true of the
"claim for relief" of the Federal Rules (1938). The question to be
considered here is whether a federal court in applying a state statute
of limitations should proceed according to state views of what consti· " and appIy state d('
··
tutes a " cause of action,
enmt1ons
of" arose" and"ac61 See note 50 supra for states in which statutes of limitations are geared in whole or in
part to common-law forms of action. "Equitable" or "chancery" relief is referred to in the
statutes of the following states: Colo., Ga., Iowa, Mich., Miss., S.C., S.D., Va., and W.Va.
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crue," or whether the court should rely on definitions of "claim for relief"
worked out by the federal courts, and apply federal definitions of "arose"
and "accrue." In order to have uniformity of procedure in the federal
courts (a chief objective of the Federal Rules) it may he necessary to
· f or re1·1ef ," "arose," and "accrue" defi ned the same way m
·
have "cIaim
all federal cases involving similar situations. In order to have uniformity of result in actions involving state-created rights (the objective of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins) it may be necessary to have all courts-state
and federal-applying a particular statute of limitations give the statute
the same interpretation. If, for instance, a particular "cause of action"
is considered by state courts as having accrued at one time, and by federal courts as having accrued at another time, the choice of tribunal
may be governed by this difference of view. In this situation, advantages of uniformity of procedure are outweighed by advantages of uniformity of result.
Rawlings v. Ray (1941) 62 was an action to enforce a federallycreated right. As the remedy sought was legal, the state statute of limitations was applicable. The statute provided that an action of the type
involved must be commenced "within three years after the cause of
action shall accrue." For the meaning of the word "accrue" Hughes, C.
J., referred to a state case (Holloway v. Morris, 1931)63 in which it
was said that "it is well settled that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in any case until there is a complete and present cause of action." He then stated: "The question as to the time when there was a complete and present cause of action ... is a federal question." 64 In another
case to enforce a federally-created right, Cope v. Anderson (1947), 65
the Supreme Court was called on to decide where the cause of action
"arose" in order to determine what state statute of limitations should be
applied. Black, J., stated:
"The Ohio Supreme Court has itself said that a 'cause of
action is the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right
of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.' . . . Our appraisal of the Ohio
borrowing statute, the opinions of the courts of that state, and
the circumstances leading to this suit, persuade us that the cause
of action 'arose' in Kentucky within the meaning of the Ohio borrowiF1g statute. . . . We have been referred to no Ohio decisions,
312 U.S. 96, 61 S.Ct 473 (1941).
1s2·Ark. 1096, 34 S.W. (2d) 750 (1931).
64 For a similar holding in a similar case see Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S. 217, 63 S.Ct.
175 (1942).
65 331 U.S. 461 at 466-7, 67 S.Ct. 1340 (1947).
62
63
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and have been unable to 6.nd any, which contradict our conclusion
that events which culminated in this suit justify our holding that
this 'cause of action' 'arose' in Kentucky within the meaning of the
Ohio statute."
As to when the cause of action "accrued" the Court held that the answer
to this question depended on "federal law."
Pickett 11. Aglinski ( 4th Cir. 1940) 66 involved a state-created right.
After referring to the applicable state statute of limitations, Parker, J.,
stated:
"The decisions of West Virginia must be followed in the interpretation of this statute; and there can be no question but that,
under those decisions, the period of limitations runs from the time
when the wrong is committed and the cause of action accrues, and
not from the plaintiff's discovery of it."
A similar position was taken by the Supreme Court in West 11. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1940). 67 In this case, which involved state-created
rights, the trial court held that a cause of action for wrongful transfer
of stock accrues when demand is made on the corporation to reinstate
claimant's interests. This was in accord with a decision made by a
state court. The Circuit Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) reversed, holding that such a cause of action accrues when the stock is transferred.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the views of the state court
should be followed. Stone, J., stated:
"Since the equitable relief sought in this suit is predicated upon
petitioners' legal rights growing out of respondent's unlawful transfer of the stock to the assignee of the life tenant, the state 'laws'
which, by §34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, 28 U.S.C.,
§725, are made 'the rules of decision in trials at common law' de6.ne the nature and extent of petitioner's right. See Russell 11.
Todd, 309 U.S. 280,289. And the rules of decision established by
judicial decisions of state courts are 'laws' as well as those prescribed by statute. Erie Railroad Co. 11. Tompkins . ..."
In Guaranty Trust Co. 11. York (Supreme Court, 1945)68 we are
told that the policy of Erie Railroad 11. Tompkins "touches vitally the
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts."
Also:
66 ll0 F. (2d) 628 at 629 (1940).
67 311 U.S. 223 at 236, 61 S.Ct. 179
68 Supra at note 58.

(1940).
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"In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same,
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
would be if tried in a State court."
Taken literally this statement seems to mean that a federal court in a
diversity case should apply the same "legal rules," substantive and procedural, as would be applied by a state court in a similar case. But we
know this cannot be a proper interpretation of the Rules of Decision
Act. The Rules of Civil Procedure continually remind us that Congress has empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe "the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
in civil actions." Of the "legal rules" which "determine the outcome of
litigation," some are uniform rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court. If these latter rules differ from the rules of the state in
which the federal court is sitting, this difference may mean one outcome for a particular litigation in a state court, and a different outcome for a similar litigation in the federal court. How this possibility
of difference in result can be avoided short of complete conformity is
difficult to see. Furthermore, the general superiority of the procedure
of the federal court over that of the state court, or vice versa, may inB.uence a party to choose the forum having the better procedure. But,
again, it is hard to see how this can be avoided without complete conformity. And even with complete conformity, there may be differences
in the personalities of the judges of state and federal courts which will
influence the choice of forum. Where the basis of choice of forum is
superior procedure or personnel there can be no reasonably certain prediction that the outcome of the litigation will be different because of
the choice. The same is true of specific differences in procedure unless
some act or omission has already occurred which will give a controlling
advantage under one scheme of procedure and not under the other. The
test here suggested is ability to predict before the forum is selected that
one outcome is probable in one forum and a different outcome is probable in the other forum because of differences in the "legal rules" which
will be applied. Such a prediction can be made only when the act or
omission to which the legal rule is to be applied has already occurred.
In West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (supra) 69 the controlling facts
had occurred before the forum was selected. The stock involved was
69 At note

67.
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transferred by the defendant in 1927. In 1934 the plaintiffs brought
suit in a state court for damages. Judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed, the appellate court holding that proof of demand and refusal
was necessary to show conversion. In 1937 plaintiffs made the required
demand, and then brought suit in a federal court. The trial court held
that the cause did not accrue until the demand was made, and, therefore, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court
of appeals reversed holding that demand was not prerequisite to accrual,
and that plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitations and laches. Had this
decision not been reversed by the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs would
have been defeated by their choice of forum.
In Pickett v. Aglinski (supra) 70 the controlling facts had occurred
before the forum was selected. The defendant performed an operation
on the plaintiff's arm in December 1934. He ceased treating plaintiff
on March 1, 1935, and did not examine him afterwards except once
in June 1937. On October 19, 1937, it was discovered that a gauze or
sponge inserted in 1934 had not been removed. Action was commenced
October 10, 1938. The court of appeals held that plaintiff's cause of
action "accrued" when the injury was received; not when it was discovered. Had there been a difference on this point between state and
federal law, it is obvious that plaintiff would have selected the forum
applying the more favorable rule.
In any case an action cannot be properly commenced until the cause
of action is complete. Before commencing an action the plaintiff will
know that his cause of action is complete, when it became complete,
and where it arose. He will know how much time has elapsed since his
cause accrued. Where he has a choice of forums he will take into account any differences in time limitations and any differences in inter.
· ""arose,"an
d "accrue. "Wh
pretations
of"cause of acnon,
· en, b ecause of such differences, his action will be barred in one forum and not
in another, his choice will mean a difference in result. Where a plaintiff has a choice between a state court and a federal court there should
be no differences in time limitations or in interpretations of "cause of
· " "arose, " or "accrue. " 0therw1se,
· th e ch 01ce
· of f orum may b e
action,
influenced by these differences contrary to the policy of the Rules of
Decision Act indicated by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
In order to eliminate the above bases of choice in diversitv cases
a federal court sitting in a particular state will apply that stat~'s time
limitations along with its interpretations of "cause of action," "arose,"
70 At

note 66.
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and "accrue." In applying state statutes of limitations in cases involving
federally-created rights, federal courts will follow state views as to where
the cause of action "arose," but will follow federal views as to when the
cause "accrued."
Legal rules which do their work before an action is commenced are
not rules of procedure.

4. When an Action Is Deemed "Commenced"
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "A civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Rule 4(a)
provides: "Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons and deliver it for service to the marshal or to a person
specially appointed. to serve it." The statutes of limitations of many
states contain provisions declaring when actions shall be deemed commenced for the purpose of stopping the running of time limitations.71
The Kansas statute72 is typical:

"An action shall be deemed commenced within the meaning
of this article, as -to each defendant, at the date of the summons
which is served on him, or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him. Where service by
publication is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced at the
date of the first publication. An attempt to commence an action
shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof within
the meaning of this article when the party faithfully, properly and
diligently endeavors to procure a service; but such attempt must
be followed by the first publication or service of the summons
within sixty days."
In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. (1949) 73 the Supreme Court was
called on to decide whether this statute or the federal rules should be
followed in a diversity case by a federal court sitting in Kansas in determining whether the action had been commenced within the time
limited. The case involved a highway accident which occurred October
l, 1943. Plaintiff filed his complaint in the federal court September 4,
1945. Summons was promptly issued, but was not served until December 28, 1945. Defendant pleaded an applicable two-year statute of
limitations, and moved for a summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that
the filing of the complaint stopped the running of the time limitation,
71 See survey of state statutes infra p. 964 ff.
72 Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) §60-308.
73 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233 (1949), noted

in 48

MICH.

L. REv. 531 (1950).
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citing the federal rules. Defendant argued that the running of the
time limitation was not stopped until the summons was served, citing
the Kansas statute. The trial court held for the plaintiff, but was reversed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court agreed with the
court of appeals, Douglas, J., saying:
"Erie R. Co. 11. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, ... was premised
on the theory that in diversity cases the rights enjoyed under local
law should not vary because enforcement of those rights was
sought in the federal court rather than in the state court. If recovery could not be had in the state court, it should be denied in the
federal court. Otherwise, those authorized to invoke the diversity
jurisdiction would gain advantages over those confined to state
courts."
It does not appear, however, that plaintiff's choice of tribunal was to
any extent influenced by the differences which existed between the
state and federal provisions for commencement of the action. The fact
(failure to get service within sixty days) which might have inRuenced
his choice had not occurred. The only situation in which a party can
obtain an advantage by choice of forum is where he can predict a favorable outcome because of some act or omission which has already occurred. If he is merely looking forward to some situation which may
arise in the course of a judicial proceeding, the basis of his choice is too
speculative to be taken into account. A party may prefer a federal
forum because he may, in the course of the proceedings, need the benefits of free joinder, liberal discovery, or other up-to-date federal procedure. But the only way to obviate this basis of choice is to require
complete conformity with the practice of the state. And no one advocates this.
Bomar 11. Keyes (2d Cir. 194 7)74 involved a federally-created right.
L. Hand, J., stated:
'We now hold that it is the filing of the complaint which tolls
the statute. We think that Rules 3 and 4(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure ... have made no longer applicable §17 of the New
York Civil Practice Act, which fixes the beginning of the action at
the date when the writ is served, or is put into the sheriff's hands
for service. The Rules have with some modification adopted the
practice which was apparently general in equity: i.e., that the
filing of the complaint, when followed by lodging the writ in the
marshal's hands, will toll the statute."
74

162 F. (2d) 136 at 140 (1947).
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This case was referred to in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co. as "a
suit to enforce rights under a federal statute." It was thus distinguished,
but not disapproved. As the matter now stands it again seems necessary
to distinguish between state-created rights and federally-created rights:
(1) If the action is to enforce a state-created right we look to the state
statute of limitations to determine when the action shall be deemed
commenced. (2) If the action is to enforce a federally-created right we
look to the federal rules to determine when the action shall be deemed
commenced.

5. Relation Back of Amendments
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading." That this rule affects the application of
federal time limitations in actions to enforce federally-created rights
clearly appears from the opinion of Black, J., in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. (Supreme Court, 1945).75 The amendment in this case
was from a claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act to a claim
under the Boiler Inspection Act. After quoting Rule 15(c) Justice
Black stated: "There is no reason to apply a statute of limitations when,
as here, the respondent has had notice from the beginning that petitioner was trying to enforce a claim against it because of the events leading up to the death of the deceased in the respondent's yard." Does the
rule also affect the application of state time limitations in actions in
federal courts to enforce state-created rights? This question was squarely answered in Barthel v. Stamm (5th Cir. 1944).76 The original complaint alleged that D had borrowed three certain sums of money from
P's testator as evidenced by checks attached to the complaint. The contracts as thus pleaded appeared to be oral, and D pleaded the state
statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts. P then amended his
complaint so as to make it appear that the contracts were in writing.
This was done after the time for suing on the contracts as written contracts had expired. Sibley, J., stated:
"It is further argued that limitation is a matter of substantive
law and not alterable by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and that under the Georgia decisions the introduction by amendment of the
75
10

323 U.S. 574, 65 S.Ct. 421 (1945).
145 F. (2d) 487 at 491 (1944).
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written contracts would be a new cause of action which would not
relate back to the date of the original suit. We agree that limitation is a matter of substance rather than of procedure; but assuming
the Georgia decisions on the effect of an amendment are as asserted, nevertheless the Rules validly fix the potential scope of a petition in a federal court which identifies a claim, and the relation of
an amendment which amplifies and further explains the transaction out of which the claim arises, for these things are procedural.
Limitation is suspended by the filing of a suit because the suit
warns the defendant to collect and preserve his evidence in reference to it. When a suit is filed in a federal court under the Rules,
the defendant knows that the whole transaction described in it will
be fully sifted, by amendment if need be, and that the form of the
action or the relief prayed or the law relied on will not be confined
to their first statement. So long as the amendment is of the sort
described in the above quoted Rule it is within the scope of the
original suit and part of it."
A similar answer had been given by Underwood, D.J., in White 11.
Holland Furnace Co. (D.C., S.D. Ohio, E.D., 1939).77 Judge Underwood clearly recognized the necessity of applying statutes of limitations
to new causes of action set up by amendment. "But," he observed, "the
rule has been broadened by liberalizing the meaning ·of the term 'cause
of action' by the courts and the new federal procedure." In L. E. Whitham Construction Co. 11. Remer (10th Cir. 1939)78 a different result
was reached. The original complaint contained a "cause of action" for
alleged wrongful death. After trial, appeal, and reversal, the plaintiff
amended by adding a claim for medical expenses incurred during the
decedent's last illness, and one for pain suffered by decedent before his
death. Relying on Rule lS(c), counsel for plaintiff argued that the
amendments related back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. Phillips, J., stated: 'We are of the opinion that the rule is not
applicable where the amendment introduces a different and additional
claim or cause of action." The court relied on state statutes and decisions to show that the statutory cause of action for wrongful death was
separate and distinct from the cause of action which accrued to the
injured person in his lifetime. It should be noted,. however, that both
causes of action arose out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence"
described in the original complaint. By the filing of the original complaint the defendant was warned to "collect and preserve his evidence."The claims set forth in the amendments were "potentially" within the
77
78

31 F. Supp. 32 at 34 (1939).
105 F. (2d) 371 (1939).
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scope of the original complaint. In Burdick-Baron Co. v. Swi~ & Co.
(5th Cir. 1950)79 the amendment was from breach of warranty to
fraud in making the representations. The action was to enforce statecreated rights. After quoting a state statute which provided that "no
subsequent amendment or supplement changing any of the facts or
grounds of liability or defense shall be subject to a plea of limitations,"
Rice, D.J., speaking for the court of appeals, stated: "We think" this
statute "is applicable here." If, in this case, the court had applied Rule
15(c) instead of the state statute, the result most probably would have
been the same due to the fact that the relation-back provisions of both
are broad and liberal. Nevertheless, the court's failure to refer to Rule
15(c) is perplexing, and somewhat disturbing. Is the shadow of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins beginning to fall on Rule 15(c)?80
In states not having statutes or decisions as broad and liberal as Rule
15(c) cases may arise in which the relation back of an amendment will
depend on whether the state or federal rule is applied. In such a case,
when brought to enforce a state-created right, must the federal court
apply the state rule so there will be uniformity of result? The answer
given in Barthel v. Stamm (supra) 81 is "no," but that case was decided
before the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins had been extended to
its present scope. At the time of that decision it was still permissible
to distinguish substantive law from rules of procedure. Despite the extension of the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins it does not seem
reasonable to believe that the Supreme Court will go so far as to declare
that the scope of a federal pleading in a diversity case must be determined by state law so that it will have the same scope as that of a similar pleading in a state court. Furthermore, it does not seem likely that
a plaintiff having a choice between a state court and a federal court will
choose the federal court because the federal rule for the relation back
of amendments is more liberal than that of the state. At the time such
a choice must be made no event will have occurred on which a differ. ence in result may be predicted.

6. Change of Venue
Title 28, U.S.C., section 1404 provides: "For the convenience of
Ser. 308, §15c.l, case 2; 180 F. (2d) 424.
of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is clearly apparent in Nola Electric Co. v.
Reilly, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 93 F. Supp. 164. Ryan, J., first held (in 1948) that an amendment
(from tort to contract) related back under Rule 15(c). Upon rehearing (after the decision
of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., supra note 73) Judge Ryan held that the question of
relation back should be decided in accordance with state statutes and decisions.
81 At note 76.
79 13 Fed. Rules
80 The influence
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parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." Section 1406 provides: "The district court of a
district in which is :6.led a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."
These provisions are new (I 948), and, providing as they do for transfer
of a case from one state to another, raise some new questions with respect to the application of state statutes of limitations. ( 1) If an action
is brought in a state where it is barred by the state statute of limitations
may it be transferred at the request of the plaintiff to a state in which
it would not have been barred? (2) If an action is brought in a state
where it is not barred by the state statute of limitations may it be transferred at the request of the defendant to a state in which it would have
been barred? (3) If either of the above-supposed cases is transferred,
which statute of limitations shall be applied? Answer to the third
question is suggested by the answer to question two. The :6.rst question
was considered in Bolten 11. General Motors Corporation (D.C., N.D.
Illinois, E.D., 1949).82 In this case the plaintiff, instead of commencing his action in the state in which his cause of action arose, which
state had a :6.ve-year statute of limitations, commenced it in a state
having a two-year statute. After the defendant had moved for a summary judgment, the plaintiff moved to dismiss without prejudice, or, in
the alternative, to have the case transferred to the state in which the
cause of action arose. The plaintiff's motion was denied. After pointing out that a federal court should apply the general statute of limitations of the forum in cases involving common-law rights, Campbell,
J., remarked: "The selection of the forum was plaintiff's, and he should
not now be permitted to transfer the action indiscriminately." The
second of the above questions was considered in Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises (D.C., New Mexico, 1949).83 This action was commenced in
a state having a four-year statute of limitations after it was too late to bring
it in the state in which the cause of action arose. The latter state had
a two-year statute. The defendant moved to have the case transferred
to the state in which the cause of action arose for convenience of parties
and witnesses. The plaintiff resisted this motion on two grounds: (I)
The action "might" not "have been brought'' in the state in which the
cause of action arose, because it would have been barred by the statute
of limitations of that state. (2) It would not be "in the interest of juss2 81 F. Supp. 851 (1949).
83

85 F. Supp. 410 (1949).
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tice" to transfer the case to the state in which the cause of action arose,
because it would be barred by the statute of limitations of that state.
After exacting from the defendant a promise not to plead the statute of
limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose, the court
ordered the case transferred to that state for trial. Hatch, J., was clearly
of the opinion that the plaintiff's first objection to the transfer was without merit, but was doubtful concerning the second. He suggests that
"it could be held under Section l 404(a) that a transfer to another district is for the purpose of trial alone"; also that "the rule should be that
the legal rights of the parties are determined by the law of the state or
district in which the cause originates." While inclined to these views,
Judge Hatch was unwilling to base a decision on them. Instead, he
relied on the defendant's assurance that it would not rely on the statute
of limitations of the state in which the cause arose, considering that the
defendant would be bound by this assurance as an estoppel. Headrick
v. Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. (10th Cir. 1950)84 was commenced in a state
court of a state other than the one in which the cause of action arose.
The state selected was the only one in which the defendant could be
sued, and the action would not be barred by time limitations. After
having the case removed to a federal court, the defendant moved to dismiss it on the ground of forum non conveniens, or, in the alternative,
to have it transferred to the state in which it arose. The trial court dismissed the case, indicating that it would have transferred it to the state
in which it arose had the statute of limitations of that state not run.
The court of appeals reversed. The fact that it was too late to sue in the
state in which the cause of action arose was considered no reason for
refusing to make the transfer. In the .first place, it had not been established that the defendant could or would rely on the statute of that
state. In the second place, the trial court was "in error" in assuming that
upon a transfer to the state in which the cau~e arose, the statute of limitations of that state would be applicable. When a case removed to a
federal court is transferred to another state, there is, according to the
court of appeals, no logical reason why it should not remain a case of
the first state "still controlled by the law and policy of that state."
In Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co. (2d Cir. 1950)85
L. Hand, J., stated: "When an action is transferred, it remains what it
was; all further proceedings in it are merely referred to another tribunal,
leaving untouched whatever has already been done." This statement
clearly indicates the position which should be taken with respect to the
84
85

182 F. (2d) 305 (1950).
178 F. (2d) 866 at 868 (1950).
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application of state statutes of limitations to transfer cases. Time limitations apply to· commencement, not to trial. There is no reason why ah
action cannot be commenced in one state, and tried in another. If an
action has been commenced within the time limited by the statutes of
the state of commencement, the action has been commenced in time.
Whatever has already been done should be left untouched. This should
apply to all transfer cases whether removed from state courts or commenced originally in federal courts. If the statute of limitations of the
state in which a transfer case is commenced has a ''borrowing" provision, 86 that provision should be applied by the court to which the case
is transferred. This will mean that the time limitation applied will not
be longer than that of the state in which the cause of action arose.
If, contrary to the views expressed above, a federal court to which
a case has been transferred should apply the statute of limitations of the
state of the forum, it may tum out that the action will be barred when
it would not have been barred if tried in a state court of the state in
which it was commenced. This, it seems, would be contrary to the
policy of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
C. Under Federal Constitution
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (Supreme Court, 1938)87 Brandeis,
J., stated: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts." The
"unconstitutionality" of the course pursued in· the past was said to be
"clear."88 But, in disapproving the course pursued, "we do not hold
unconstitutional §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other
Act of Congress." In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York (Supreme Court,
1945)89 Frankfurter, J., stated: "Although §34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 . . . directed that the 'laws of the several States . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law . . . ,' this was
deemed, consistently for over a hundred years, to be merely declaratory
of what would in any event have governed the federal courts and therefore was equally applicable to equity suits." This statement, coupled
with the views expressed by Justice Brandeis, suggests that the Rules
of Decision Act has never been really effective, but has been merely
86 See discussion infra p.
87 Supra at note 55.
88 The "course" referred

1 (1842).
89 Supra at note 58.

982.
to· was that indicated by Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. ( 41 U.S.)

1951]

LIMITATIONS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

963

declaratory of a practice impliedly required by the Federal Constitution. It should be noted that the Erie and York cases involved "statecreated" rights. To the extent the Rules of Decision Act makes state
laws creating "rights" rules of decision in federal cases involving those
rights, the view that the Rules of Decision Act is merely declaratory of
what "would in any event have governed the federal courts," seems
correct. It is absurdly obvious that the federal government, whether
acting through Congress or its courts, cannot create a "state-created"
right. In an action to enforce a state-created right a federal court must
look to the law creating the right to determine the nature and extent of
the right. Were the Rules of Decision Act repealed tomorrow, the
federal courts would, of necessity, continue to look to state law to determine the nature and extent of state-created rights. If Congress or a
federal court should undertake to add to or subtract from a state-created
right, the act would be in violation of the Federal Constitution. Does
this mean that Congress has no power to enact a general statute of
limitations applicable to actions brought in federal courts to enforce
state-created rights? The answer seems to be yes. 90
What is said above with respect to state-created "rights" does not
apply to "remedies." In the York case, supra,91 Justice Frankfurter
stated:
"State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court
must give simply because a federal court is available as an alternative tribunal to the State's courts. Contrariwise, a federal court
may afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized
by a State even though a State court cannot give it."
It thus appears that Congress or the federal courts may afford "remedies"
to be applied by federal courts in actions brought to enforce state-created
rights. That Congress has power to prescribe "procedure" for actions
brought in federal courts to enforce state-created rights, seems entirely clear. If Congress should enact a general statute of limitations
applicable to actions brought in federal courts to enforce state-created
rights, the statute would ''bear" on the state-created rights "vitally and
not merely formally or negligibly." 92 As pointed out earlier in this discussion,93 a general statute of limitations, "although belonging to the
90 Time limitations worked out as limitations on jurisdiction would be constitutional,
but would not be equivalent to a general statute of limitations.
91 Supra at note 58.
92 In the York case, supra at note 58, Frankfurter, J., stated at llO: "A statute that
would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created
right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly."
93 Supra at note 24.
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lex fori, and applying immediately to the remedy," indirectly affects
the "right."94
Insofar as the Rules of Decision Act (revised, 1948)95 requires
federal courts to apply state statutes of limitations in actions brought in
federal courts to enforce federally-created rights, the act is effective,
and not merely declaratory of what the federal courts would be compelled to do in the absence of such a statute. 96 While it is clear the
states cannot add to or subtract from federally-created rights, there is no
reason why Congress cannot direct the federal courts to apply to such
rights state statutes of limitations.

II
SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES*

A. General Comparisons
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, federal courts
sitting in diversity-of-citizenship cases must apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the court is sitting. In the absence of specific
time limitations in the federal statutes and in light of the revised Rules
of Decision Act, state statutes of limitation are applied in actions enforcing federally-created rights. Therefore, it becomes important to see
how much actual variance in limitation periods exists from state to state.
For as the state statutes differ, so will the result differ among federal
district courts sitting in similar cases. Although not a matter of primary
emphasis in this article, these differences also present a real problem in
non-federal cases where the defendant, usually a corporation, can be
94 State courts uniformly take the position that general statutes of limitations pertain to
the remedy, and, therefore, in determining whether an action is barred, apply the statute
of the forum. Goonmca, CoNFLIC'r OF LAws, 3d ed., 240 (1949). In Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941), the Supreme Court held
that federal courts in diversity cases "must follow conllict of laws rules prevailing in the
states in which they sit."
95 28 U.S.C. §1652. As revised in 1948 the section reads: "The laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
96 Courts can and have operated without statutes of limitations. See early territorial
experience bridly noted in BLUME, TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME CotmT OF THE
TERRITORY OF MicmcAN, 1805-1814, Vol. 1, p. 96.
" No citations other than to the names of states will be given in the following notes.
The reader's attention is directed to the Table of Statutes, page 1007, for citations to the
general statutes of limitation of the several states. Because of the basic dissimilarity between
the civil law and the common law, only such provisions of the Louisiana statute of prescriptions have been included as seem clearly compatible with provisions found in other
jurisdictions.
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sued in any of several states where time limitations may and usually do
differ.
A comparative study of the time limitations of the several jurisdictions reveals that though the individual peculiarities are many, there is
basic agreement in purpose and method. For example, when examining
actions involving the basic areas of the law such as contracts, real property, personal property and negligence, one finds a rather small variance
between minimum and ma.icimum time limitations. Yet over and above
these common provisions are a multitude of particular limitations on
highly specialized types of actions which greatly complicate the task
of grouping and comparing limitations on like causes of actions. In all
probability most of these uncommon provisions were added as the result of a single case which the legislature found unsatisfactory, or as
the result of a special problem arising at a particular time. 97 In many
instances provisions have been retained, apparently through legislative
inertia, long past their time of usefulness. 98
General statutes of limitations tend to fall into three rather indefinite categories of emphasis: ( l) those in states retaining the old forms
of action;99 (2) those in states following the New York Code of Civil
Procedure of 1848;100 and (3) those in a large group of states which do
not accept either system completely, some speaking in whole or part of
actions in the nature of the old forms of actions,1° 1 and others approximating the New York statute.102
One also notes that groups of states tend to have similar or identical
provisions in all or part of their general statutes of limitation. Wyoming
essentially adopted the Ohio statute. West Virginia retained much of
the earlier Virginia statute, and has tended to enact similar provisions
subsequent to 1863. Geographical groups of states often have particular
identical provisions. For example, Kentucky and Missouri have ·a
unique requirement that fraud or mistake be discovered within ten
years. Illinois, Michigan and Ohio provide for limitation on recovery
97 E.g., action for damages arising from use or occupancy of lands for right of way by
railroads in North Carolina; action for damages caused by steamboat or other vessels in
Kentucky; actions for damages caused by commercial or non-commercial dams in Minnesota.
98 E.g., limitations on writs of inquisition to determine damages to old mill seats by
the building of races, dams or ponds in Delaware, and on actions based on statutes merchant
or statutes of the staple in Maryland. The Maryland provision stems from the first statute
of limitations in 1715, XXX ARCHIVBs OF MARYLAND 229, 231.
00 E.g., Me., Md., Pa., R.I., Vt.
100 E.g., Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.C., N.D., S.D., Utah.
101 E.g., Colo., T.H., N.J., Mass.
102E.g., Minn., Mo., N.M., Tex., Wis. In addition, one must include as a separate
category Louisiana, which retains a civil law system adapted from the Code Napoleon in

1803.
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of charges and overcharges by and against intrastate carriers designed to
supplement similar limitations on actions involving interstate carriers.103
In the process of the survey of state statutes of limitation carried on
in connection with this article, it was found that provisions of the statutes fall into three general categories: (I) time limitations on specified
causes of action; (2) conditions resulting in suspension or extension of
the periods limited; and (3) general rules for applying time limitations.
The scope of the various provisions will be taken up in that order.104

B. Time Limitations

.

I. Damages and Sums Due for Breach of Contract
Limitation of recovery for breach of contract is common to all
jurisdictions, although the type of contracts limited may vary. Some
states limit formal contracts as opposed to informal contracts. Limitations on formal contracts include those on some or all types of bonds,1° 5
recognizances,1° 6 and negotiable or commercial instruments.101 A number of states retaining the seal specially limit actions on sealed instruments.108 Many states limit actions on special kinds of informal contracts, including actions on stated accounts, open accounts, or accounts
in general, both mercantile and non-mercantile,109 and certain miscel103 Found in 49 U.S.C.

(1946) §16(3).
attempt has been made to collate special limitations on statutory causes of action
appearing elsewhere than in the section of the statutes dealing with time limitations in
general.
105 Ala., Ariz.., Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Ga., Idaho, ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Me.,
Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., Ohio., Okla., Pa., S.C.,
S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, W.Va., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-five. Average: seven and
one-half years. Extremes: one year, Cal., Conn., Me., Mass., Pa., Utah; twenty years, Ga.,
N.J., Pa.
100 Conn., Del., Ky., Me., Md., Mich., N.H., Va., W.Va. Number: nine. Average:
seven years. Extremes: one year, Conn.; twenty years, N.H.
101 Ark., Conn., Del., Ga., ill., Ind., Ky., La., Mass., Minn., N.M., Pa., S.C., Vt.
Number: fourteen. Average: seven years. Extremes: six months, Conn.; twenty years, Mass.
10s Ala., Alaska, Ark., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Ga., Md., Mass., Mo., Neb., N.H.,
N.J., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Ore., R.I., S.C., S.D., Vt., Va., W.Va., Wis., Wyo. Number:
twenty-six. Average: thirteen years. Extremes: five years, Ark., Neb.; twenty years, Fla.,
Ga., Mass., N.H., R.I., S.C., S.D., Wis. Arkansas (Const. 1874, Schedule 1) and Oregon
(Ore. C.L. §2-804) retain the seal solely for the purposes of the statute of limitations.
Missouri (Mo. R.S. §3344), Nebraska (Neb. R.S. §76-212), New York (N.Y.C.P.A.
§342), Ohio (Throckmorton's Ohio Code §32), and Wyoming (Wyo. Comp. Stat. §§66-214,
66-215) have abolished the use of private seals, but have retained a special limitation on
actions on some or all sealed contracts.
100 Ala., Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Ind., Ky., La., Md., Miss., Mont., Nev.,
N.J., N.M., Pa., R.I., Tex., Utah, Va., W.Va. Number: twenty-two. Average: four years.
Extremes: one year, Md.; six years, Ala., Conn., Cal., Ga., Ind., Nev., N.J., Pa., R.I., Tex.,
Utah. California, Montana, Nevada and Utah set no limitation on recovery of bank
deposits.
104 No
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laneous actions for money due. 11 ° Contract actions limited include
those based on written contracts,111 unwritten contracts, express or
implied,112 or contracts in general without regard to sealing or writing.113 In addition, a handful of states place a special limitation on
actions for breach of promise of marriage.114

2. Enforcement of Non-contractual Money-Obligations
The bulk of actions falling under this head are actions to recover
statutory liabilities and actions to enforce judgments. Many states limit
actions for recovery of all statutory liabilities other than penalties or
forfeitures. 115 Maximum periods are provided for suits to recover fines,
penalties or forfeitures in general,110 by persons aggrieved,117 by persons
prosecuting,118 or concurrently with and alternatively to such persons,
by the prosecutor of the state or of the country where the offense was
committed.U 9 A special group of actions to recover penalties and for110 E.g., for a debt or lending in Ala., Ariz., Del., N.J., N.Y., and Pa.; for money paid
by a bank on forged indorsement in Cal., Mont., and Ohio; for wages and fees in Conn.,
Iowa, La., Md., Mont., and Wis.
The fourteen states having such provisions are Ala., Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Iowa, La.,
Md., Mont., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., Wis. Average: four years. Extremes: six months, Mont.
(recovery of police salaries); seventeen years, Conn. (non-negotiable note).
111 Ala., Ark., Cal., Conn., Fla., Ga., Idaho, ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Mo. (for payment of money or property only), Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio, Okla., S.C., Tex.,
Utah, Va., Wash., W.Va., Wyo. Number: twenty-six. Average: eight years. Extremes: two
years, Cal.; twenty years, Ind., S.C. When Indiana abolished the seal the limitation period
on all contract actions was raised to the period formerly allowed for actions on sealed
contracts.
112 Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., Fla., Idaho, ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Miss., Mont., Neb.,
Nev., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Tex., Utah, Wash., Wyo. Number: twenty-two. Average: four
years. Extremes: two years, Cal., Tex.; eight years, Wyo.
113 The most common contract limitation. Ala., Alaska, Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., D.C.,
Ga., T.H., Ind., La., (semble), Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Vt., Va., W.Va., Wis., Wyo. (foreign contracts only).
Number: thirty-seven. Average: five and one-half years. Extremes: two years, Minn.;
twenty years, Mass. Hawaii differentiates between local and foreign contracts.
114 Ariz., Ky., Tenn., Tex., Wash. The Washington limitation is three years, the
others one year. In addition, Maine, New Hampshire and Wyoming include in their general statutes of limitations their so-called Anti-Heart Balm Statute, abolishing actions for
breach of promise of marriage, seduction and criminal conversation.
115 Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wis., Wyo. Number: twenty-four.
Average: four and one-half years. Extremes: one year, Ariz., Utah; twenty years, Ga.
110 Conn., D.C., ill., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Miss., Neb., Ohio., Okla., Tenn., Utah
(foreign statute), Wis., Wyo. Number: fifteen. Average: two years.
111 Ala., Alaska, Cal., Del., Fla., Ky., Minn., Mo., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore.,
Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Wash. Number: nineteen. Average: two and one-half years.
11s Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Ga., Idaho, Me., Mass., Minn., Mo., Mont.,
Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: twentyfive. Average: one year.
119 Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Idaho, Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont.,
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feitures attaches to federal and state wage-hour laws. Some states limit
recoveries under either state or federal laws,120 or under the Fair Labor
Standards Act by name.121 A few jurisdictions, attempting to remedy
the undesirable situation resulting from congressional failure to limit
actions on federally-created rights, limit recoveries under any federal
statute for which no other limitation period is provided.122 By the enactment by Congress in 1947 of a statute of limitations on certain federal
wage-hour statutes,123 applicability of such state limitations has been
superseded, though such statutes may still apply by their terms to state
wage-hour law recoveries, or recoveries under other federal statutes
than those singled out by Congress.
Only in some jurisdictions are all juagments treated in the same
manner.124 In others a shorter period for enforcement is allotted to a
foreign judgment than to a domestic judgment.125 The right of enforcement of a foreign judgment against one moving into the forum and
residing there a certain number of years may be cut off.126 Several
states distinguish between judgments of courts of record and those of
courts not of record. 127 Some jurisdictions do not limit in terms of
actions to enforce judgments, but deem judgments satisfied after a given
number of years have passed.128 In addition, a time may be set beyond
which no writ of execution shall be issued or no judgment revived. 129

3. Recovery of Real Property
One of the most difficult groups of actions to compare is that respecting recovery of real property. Part of the difficulty stems from the
Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: twentyfive. Average: two years.
120 Del., Fla., Ga., Iowa, Minn., N.M., Ohio, Ore., S.D., Tenn. Periods range from
one to three years.
121Afa., Colo., Md., Mo., N.C.
122 Colo., T.H., Neb., Wyo.
123 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §255.
124 Ark., Cal., Idaho, Ky., Md., Mich., Minn., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.M., N.C., N.D.,
Ore., S.C., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wash. Number: nineteen. Average: ten years.
125 Colo., Fla., Miss., N.D., Wis. Average on domestic judgments is twelve years, on
foreign judgments, eight years. Mississippi sets a shorter period on foreign judgments against
Mississippi residents than such judgments against nonresidents.
120 Tex., Va., W.Va., Wyo.
121 Colo., Fla., T.H., Ind., Iowa, Me., Mont., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C. Number:
eleven. Average on judgments of courts of record, twelve years; on courts not of record, six
years.
128 T.H., Ind., La., Me., Mass., Miss., Mo., N.Y. Number: eight. Average: fourteen
years. Extremes: seven years, Miss.; twenty years, Ind., Me., Mass., N.Y.
129 Conn., Ill., Ky., La., Me., Mass., Miss., N.J., N.C., Tex., Vt. Number: eleven.
Average: seven and one-half years. Extremes: one year, Conn., Me., Mass.; twenty years,
Ill., N.J.
,
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retention in the general statute of limitations of substantive statutory
materials relating to adverse possession. Their presence is explained historically by the fact that the first statutes of limitation were aimed primarily at actions for recovery of land which related directly to the kind of ownership asserted by both claimant and defendant, and which resulted in
confirmed title in an adverse possessor.130 But such provisions occupy
a somewhat anomalous position in a modem general statute of limitations which embraces more non-real property actions than actions relating to real property. A second factor complicating the situation is the
reBection in some one or more American jurisdictions of each phase of
the historical development of general statutes of limitations. The earliest development was the barring of claims older than a certain year.131
Some American jurisdictions have adapted this by barring claims older
than a certain number of years.132 The second step was to bar claims
by persons whose last seisin was more distant than sixty years.133 A
number of American jurisdictions still limit actions for a recovery of real
property in terms of last seisin or possession by the claimant or his pre-·
decessor in interest.134 The third, and perhaps most important step,
was to bar issuance of certain real property writs and exercise of a right
of entry more than twenty years after the right accrued.135 A number
of American states limit the time in which a right of entry can be exercised after accrual of the right,1 36 while of these several restrict the time
in which an action on an entry can be made following the actual
entry.137 The final development, both in England138 and the United
States,1 39 has been to limit actions for recovery of real property of certain
130 AMEs, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 197-207 (1913).
131 Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. Ill, c. 8 (1235); Statute of

Westminster, 3 Edw. I, c.
39 (1275). Iowa has adopted this system of barring claims older than a certain named year.
132 Colo., Del., Fla., Ill., Ind., Minn., Miss., N.J., S.D., Tex., Va., Wis. Number:
twelve. Limitations range from three years in South Dakota to seventy-five years in Illinois.
Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin allow extension of the period if the claim is recorded, Wisconsin allowing as much as sixty additional years. Minnesota bars a claim only if it is not
recorded within the specified number of years.
13s Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1540).
134 Ala., Cal., Del., Fla., Idaho, Minn., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Pa., S.C., S.D.,
Tex., Utah, Wis. Number: seventeen.
1 35 Stat. 21 Jae. I, c. 16 (1623). Personal actions were also limited in this statute. See
3 BLACKSTONE's CoMMENTARIEs "'307.
1aa Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Mass., Miss., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y.,
N.C., N.D., Pa., S.C., S.D., Vt., W.Va., Wis. Number: twenty-one. Average: thirteen
years. Extremes: five years, Cal., Idaho, Nev.; twenty-one years, Pa.
137 Ark., Cal., Conn., T.H., Idaho, Mass., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Pa., S.C.,
S.D., Wis. All are limited to one year. Michigan has only the limit on bringing an action
following entry, and Massachusetts and Michigan also recognize either quiet peaceable
possession following or an action on the entry.
138 Stat. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, cc. 27, 42 (1833).
139 Ariz., Ark., D.C., T.H., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Me., Mich., Miss., Neb.,
N.H., N.J., Ohio, Okla., Tenn., Vt., Va., W.Va., Wyo. Number: twenty-three.

970

MICHIGAN

LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 49

kinds or of all kinds. A few states140 combine limitations on all actions
for recovery of real property with a requirem~nt of seisin or possession
within a certain number of years.141
Actions for the recovery of real property are also limited in terms of
persons claiming and of persons against whom claims are asserted. A
state may have only a limited period in which to recover land from adverse possessors,142 land from others than adverse possessors,1 43 or rents
and profits from real estate.144 Grantees from the state may be allowed
to recover real property from adverse possessors,1 45 or other persons,146
and may also be allowed to recover rents and profits.147 Where special
limitations are provided for suit by persons not claiming as grantees of
the state against adverse possessors, such possession may be under color
of title,148 by bare possession,1 49 or of any kind.1110 '
From a practical standpoint, mortgage matters can be classified under recovery of property. A number of states limit the time in which a
lien on real property can be foreclosed,151 although a number allow
the period to be extended if the claim is filed as a matter of record.1112
140 Alaska, Colo., Mass., Mo., Ore., Wash.
141 The average of all these actions is thirteen

years. Extremes: one year, Wis.; forty
years, S.C.
142 Cal., Ga., Mich., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Pa., S.C., S.D.,
Utah, Wis. Number: fifteen. Average: twenty-one years. Extremes: seven years, Utah;
forty years: N.Y., N.D., S.D. Rhode Island has a blanket confirmation of all grants by
the legislature.
143 Alaska, Cal., Idaho, Mass., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, S.C., S.D., Utah,
Va., W.Va., Wis. Number: sixteen. Average: fourteen years. Extremes: five years, Cal.;
forty years, Wis.
144 Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., S.C., S.D., Utah. Number:
eleven. Average: twenty-one and one-half years.
145 N.M., ten years; Md., twenty years; N.Y., N.D., forty years.
146 Cal., Colo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., S.D., Utah. Number: eight. Average:
twelve years. Extremes: five years, Cal.; twenty years, N.Y., N.D., S.D.
14 1 Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., T.H., Idaho, Ind., Ky., La., Md., Mont., N.J., Pa.,
R.I., Tenn., Utah, Va., Wash. Number: nineteen. Average: seven years. Extremes:
three years, Ark., Del., La., Md.; twenty years, Pa.
148 Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, ill., Ky., La., Me., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.M.,
N.Y., N.D., R.I., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Wis. Number: twenty-one. Average: eleven years.
Extremes: three years, Ariz., Tex.; thirty years, Tenn.
149 Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, La., Me., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.M., Wis. Number: thirteen. Average: nineteen years. Extremes: two years, Ariz.; sixty years, N.J.
150 Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., T.H., Idaho, ill., Me., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt.,
Va., W.Va., Wis. Number: thirty-one. Average: thirteen years.
151 Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., ill., Md., Iowa, Ky., Mich., Minn., Neb., N.C., N.D., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Va., W.Va. Number: eighteen. Average: thirteen years. Extremes: two
years, Cal., Conn.; thirty years, ill.
152 Colo., ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Minn., Mo., Neb., Tenn., Tex., Va., W.Va. Number:
twelve. Average: twelve and one-half years. Extremes: four years, Tex.; thirty years, Colo.
Tennessee sets no specific period of extension, while Colorado's limitation is in terms of a
maximum possible extension. Only California, Mississippi and North Carolina provide for
deficiency judgments after foreclosure, the limit being three months in California and one
year in the other two states.
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Several states limit the time in which a mortgagor can assert his equity
of redemption.153
4. Damages for Injury to Person or Property

This grouping of actions receives the most nearly uniform treatment
of any general grouping. A number of jurisdictions limit the time in
which any action can be entertained to recover damages for injury to
the person or to any non-contractual right.154 But in most general statutes of limitations certain types of personal injury actions are singled
out for special treatment. Actions for injury to the person include
assault and battery,1515 false arrest,1 56 false imprisonment,1 57 malicious
prosecution,1 158 malpractice,1 59 wrongful death,1 60 seduction,161 and
criminal conversation.162 In addition, one finds limitations on actions to
redress injury to the character either by libel,163 slander,164 or by any
153 Ala., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Md., Ky., Miss., Mont., N.Y., N.C., Pa., Utah. Number:
twelve. Average: eight and one-half years. Extremes: one year, Ind.; fifteen years, Colo.,
Ky., N.Y.
154 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Ga., T.H., Idaho, ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky.,
La., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-nine.
Average: three years. Extremes: one year, Ala., Cal., Conn., Del., Ky., La., Me., Tenn.;
six years, T.H., Minn., N.Y., N.D., S.C., Vt., Wis.
155 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., Idaho, ill., Kan., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D.,
Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis.,' Wyo. Number: thirty-four. Average: two years. Extremes: one
year, Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Kan., Md., Miss., Neb., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Utah, Wyo.;
six years, Ala.
156 D.C., Iowa, Ky., Md., Miss., Pa. Average: one year.
157 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., Idaho, ill.., Kan., Me., Md., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa.,
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-six. Average: two years.
Maryland limits applications for writs of habeas corpus to three years.
158 Ala., Ariz., D.C., ill., Kan., Ky., Mich., Neb., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Pa., Tenn.,
Tex., Wyo. Number: fifteen. Average: one year.
159 Ark., Colo., Conn., Ind., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.H., N.Y.,
N.D., Ohio, S.D., Number: sixteen. Average: two years.
160 Ala., Ariz., Cal., Conn., Fla., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.D., Pa., Tex., Utah, Wis.
Number: thirteen. Average: two years. No attempt has been made to include special limitations found in the body of wrongful death acts.
161 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Idaho, ill., Ky., Mont., Nev., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wash.,
Wis. Number: fourteen. Average: one and one-half years.
1a2 Ark., T.H., ill., Ky., Minn., Mo., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn. Number:
twelve. Average: three and one-half years. Extremes: one year, Ark., Ky., Tenn.; six years,
T.H., Minn., N.D., S.C., S.D. Wisconsin limits actions for alienation of affections to one
year.
10s Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, ill., Kan., Ky., La.,
Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: forty.
Average: one and one-half years.
164 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, ill., Kan., Ky., La.,
Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: forty-one.
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means causing injury to the character.165
A very common limitation is that on certain actions involving personal property. Such actions include those for recovery of possession,1 66
recovery for damage done,1 67 or for taking,1 68 for detaining,169 for converting,170 or for injuring such property.171
One may also find limitations on certain actions to recover damages
for injury to real property or to interests in land. A number of states
limit any action to recover for injuries done to real property.172 Several
limit actions of forcible entry or forcible entry and detainer.173

5. Special Types of Relief
With the few exceptions noted below, most of the remaining provisions of the general statutes of limitations are fringe provisions peculiar to a few states. These are the limitations which indicate legislative
disapproval of a particular court holding, or legislative selection of a
Average: one and one-half years. Extremes: six years on libel actions in Hawaii to six
months on slander actions in North Carolina and Tennessee.
165 Ala., Ariz., Ark., Ga., T.H., Ind., Iowa, N.H., N.M. Number: nine. Average:
two years.
166 Alaska, Cal., Colo., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., La.,
Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-nine. Average: four years. Extremes: three months, Cal.; ten years, La. On the basis of traditional
classification this action should be included under recovery of property. But the modern
replevin action, providing for redelivery bond and damages in default, seems to rest on
damage to interests of the owner rather than restoration of possession. The statutes so treat
it.
.
167 Ga., Md., N.J., Pa., R.I. Average: five years.
168 Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., T.H., Idaho, Kan., Ky., Me., Mass., Minn.,
Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah,
Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-one. Average: four years.
169 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Del., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Me.,
Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Tex., Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-three. Average: four years.
110 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Ga., Ill., Ky., Mass., N.M., N.C., Tenn., Tex. Number:
twelve. Average: three years.
111 Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Ga., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan.,
Ky., La., Me., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-nine.
Average: four years. Extremes in the area of damage to personal property range from three
months in California to six years in a substantial number of states.
112 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., T.H., Idaho,
Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Me., Md., Mich, Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J.,
N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wash.,
Wis., Wyo. Number: forty-four. Average: four years. Extremes: six months, Cal.; ten
years, La., Wis.
173 Ariz., Ark., Conn., Del., Kan., Neb., Okla., Tex. Number: eight. Average: two
years. Extremes: six months, Conn.; three years, Ark. These actions, while possessory in
form, seem to give redress for a tortious injury to interests in the property.
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small group of claims for special treatment. But certain types of special
claims are similarly treated in many states. These include claims
brought against decedents' estates,1 74 or against corporation officers and
stockholders.175 Limitation of actions against certain kinds of public
officials is common. Such actions include actions for damages caused by
the misconduct in office of a sheriff,176 coroner,177 constable,178 or other
public officer;179 for failure to pay over money collected on execution
by a sheriff,1 80 coroner,1 81 constable,1 82 or other officer;183 and for the escape of a prisoner arrested on civil process caused by the negligence of
any officer.184 One also finds a common limitation on actions for relief
based on grounds of fraud185 or mistake. 186

6. Residual Limitations
A large number of states include residual limitations to cover those
actions not specifically provided for, either in terms of personal actions
174 Ala., Ky., Me., Mass., Miss., Nev., N.C., Ore., Tenn., Vt., Va., Wash., Wis.
Number: thirteen. Average: six years.
115 Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Pa., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wis. Number:
twelve. Average: four years.
116 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., T.H., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Me., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis. Number:
twenty-six. Average: three years.
111 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore.,
S.C., S.D., Wash., Wis. Number: seventeen. Average: three years
11s Ala., Alaska, Cal., Conn., Idaho, Minn., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D.,
Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: sixteen. Average: three years.
110 Ala., Cal., T.H., Ind., Iowa, La., Mo., N.M., N.C., Utah, Wis. Number: eleven.
Average: three years.
180 Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Iowa, Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Ore.,
S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: nineteen. Average: three years.
181 Alaska, Cal., Idaho, Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Wash.,
Wis. Number: fourteen. Average: three years.
182 Alaska, Cal., Idaho, Minn., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah,
Wash., Wis. Number: fourteen. Average: three years.
183 Ala., Ariz., Ind., Iowa, Mo., N.J., N.Y., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., Wis. Number:
twelve. Average: three years. Extremes: two months, N.J.; ten years, Va. Five western
states, Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., and Utah, limit actions against officers or de facto officers
for improper seizures or detention of money or property to one year.
184 Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., T.H., Idaho, Me. (sheriff only), Mont., Nev., N.C.,
N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: seventeen. Average: one year. Extremes: six months, Colo.; two years, T.H., Idaho, Nev., Wash.
185 Ala., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Fla., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Minn., Mo., Mont.,
Neb., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo.
Number: twenty-eight. Average: four years. Extremes: one year, Ala.; six years, Ind., Me.,
Minn., N.Y., N.D., S.C., S.D., Wis.
186 Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Ky., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.C., Utah. Number: nine. Average:
three years.
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not otherwise provided for,187 forms of action not otherwise limited/BB
or any action for which no other limitation is provided.189

C. Suspension or Extension of Time Limitations
Provisions which either suspend the running of the ordinary time
limitation during the existence of some condition or extend the period in
which action may be brought for an additional period after a certain
condition ceases to exist are found in the statutes of limitations of all
states. Suspension: or extension usually occurs upon disability of the
plaintiff, absence of defendant, death of either party or both parties,
war, or prevention or failure of plaintiff's initial attempt to assert his
claim.

I. Disability of Plaintiff
Suspension or extension of the normal period because of disability
of plaintiff are usually treated differently in real property actions than
in personal actions, although some jurisdictions treat all actions alike.
Within each of these groups, the common disabilities are infancy, insanity, or imprisonment of the plaintiff, although one often £.nds other
types of disability which affect the normal running of the statute.
Real property actions are commonly extended in the case of infancy,190 insanity,1 91 or imprisonment of the plaintiff. 192
181 Ariz., Colo., Del., T.H., La., Me., Md., N.H., Pa., Tex., Va., W.Va., Wis. Number: thirteen. Average: five years. Extremes: one year, Va., W.Va.; twenty years, Me.
Virginia and West Virginia differentiate between actions which survive and actions which
do not.
188 Maine limits all actions of trespass except for assault and battery and false imprisonment, while Rhode Island limits all but those for injury to the person. Colorado, Maine,
New Jersey and Rhode Island limit all actions on the case except slander; Colorado, Maine
and New Jersey, except libel; New Jersey and Rhode Island, except injuries to the person;
and Pennsylvania, except on accounts between merchants.
189 Alaska, Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., Idaho, ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Mich., Miss.,
Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn.,
Utah, Wash., Wyo Number: thirty-one. Average: seven years. Extremes: two years,
Wash.; fifteen years, Ind.
100 Ark., Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, ill., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich. Miss.,
Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D.,
Utah, Va., W.Va., Wis. Number: thirty-three. Average: seven years. Four states, Ariz.,
Ga., La., and Tex., grant a period equivalent to the period originally limited. Eleven of
these states, Cal., Fla., Ky., La., Miss., Mo., Neb., Pa., Tex., Va., W.Va., will not allow an
extension averaging more than twenty-five years beyond the time of accrual.
191 See note 190, omitting La.
192 Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, ill., Me., Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont.,
Neb., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wis. Number:
twenty-six. Average: seven and one--half years. Arizona and Texas grant an extension equal
to the original period. Six states, Cal., Fla., Mo., Neb., Pa., Tex., set a maximum point
following accrual.
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Actions other than real property actions are commonly phrased in
terms of an additional period equivalent to the originally limited period
in case of plaintiff's infancy,1 93 insanity,1 94 or imprisonment.195 However, other states grant an extension in terms of a definite number of
years for infancy,1 96 ihsanity,197 or imprisonment.198
Those states which make no distinction between real property actions and all other actions have tended to adopt a shorter extension
period corresponding to that on non-real property actions in other states.
One finds an average two year extension after removal of disability
where plaintiff has been an infant,1 99 insane200 or imprisoned. 201
A few states grant an extension where any legal disability has prevented plaintiff from bringing a real property action, 202 a personal
action, 203 or any action. 204
In addition to the three primary disabilities, one may find extension
of the period in the case of married women, 205 servicemen,206 ministers
sole,207 and persons absent from the United States. 208
193 Ariz., Colo., D.C., Ga., T.H., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.J.,
N.C., Ohio, Pa., R.I., Tex., Va., W.Va. Number: twenty-one. Mississippi, Virginia and
West Virginia impose a maximum point after accrual. California and Idaho suspend the
operation of the statute during the disability period.
194 See note 193.
195 Ariz., Colo., D.C., Ga., T.H., Me., Mass., Mich., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.C., Ohio,
Pa., R.I., Tex. Number: sixteen. California, Idaho and Kentucky suspend the running of
the statute.
100 Ark., Del., D.C. (sealed), ill., Mont., N.H., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D.,
Utah, Wis, Wyo. Number: fifteen. Average: two years. Montana, Oregon and South Carolina impose a five year maximum after accrual.
197The fifteen states listed in note 196. Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota and Wisconsin impose the five year maximum.
198 Ark., D.C. (sealed), ill., Miss. (assault, battery, maiming), Mont., N.Y., N.D.,
Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wis., Wyo. Number: eighteen. Average: two years. The five year
ceiling is found in Mont., N.Y., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., and Wis.
199 Alaska, Iowa, Minn., Ore. The latter to impose a five year maximum. Alabama and
Tennessee set the usual period or three years, whichever is shorter. Maryland, Vermont and
Washington allow an amount equivalent to the original period.
200 See note 199.
201 Alaska, Minn., Ore., the latter two setting a five year maximum. The Alabama
provision for a three year period or the usual period applies to imprisonment. Vermont and
Washington allow the usual period after the disability is removed. Maryland grants no
extension for imprisoment.
202 Kan., Okla., Wyo. Colorado allows only two years following the end of the usual
limitation period.
20s Conn., Kan., Okla.
204 Indiana. Colorado's unique provision allows either two years or the usual period,
whichever is longer, when the disability ceases before the originally limited period expires.
205 Cal., Conn., Del., Idaho, Me., Nev., Tex. Query as to how many of these retain
currency. Maryland allows no extension.
206 Ark., ill., Tex.
207 Me., Mass.
208 Me., Mass., N.J., Pa., R.I. Maryland allows no extension.
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2. Absence of Defendant
It is common to either suspend or extend the operation of the statute
when the defendant either absents himself from the jurisdiction or conceals himself so that personal service cannot be had upon him. The
treatment accorded the absence usually depends upon whether the absence or concealment occurred prior to the time the cause of action
arose, or subsequent to that time.
The usual rule is that the plaintiff will be allowed a period equivalent to the originally limited period when prior to the time the cause
of action arose defendant either absented himself from the jurisdiction209 or concealed himself. 210 But if he leaves the jurisdiction211 or
conceals himself2 12 subsequent to the time the cause of action arose, the
operation of the statute is suspended during his absence. A few jurisdictions accord uniform treatment to any absence213 or any concealment.214

3. Death of Party
The primary obstacle to a satisfactory correlation of suspension or
extension of the usual limitation period because of the death of either
party or both parties is the disagreement as to the point of time from
which the provision applies. The critical point may be the time of
death, the time that letters testamentary or of administration are issued,
either time, or some intermediate point. When the plaintiff dies,
thirty-three jurisdictions allow an extension for suit by the executor
or administrator averaging one year, but in some of these states the
point of determination is the time of death, 215 while in others it is at the
209 Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Kan., Ky., Me.,
Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb, Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore.,
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number: thirty-six. Four states, N.H.,
N.J., R.I., Tex., suspend the operation of the statute between time of accrual and return.
210 Alaska, Ark., Colo., D.C., Kan., Neb., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Wash., Wyo. Number:
eleven.
211 Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Colo., Del., D.C., Fla., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Kan., Ky., Me., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J. N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo. Number:
forty-one. Rhode Island in effect tacks the period of presence before and after absence;
Cottrell v. Kennedy, 25 R.I. 99, 54 A. 1010 (1903). Michigan and New York set a minimum period of absence before the provision applies. The Vermont and Rhode Island provisions are inapplicable if defendant leaves property in the state.
·
212 Alaska, Colo., D.C., Kan., Ky., Neb., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Wash., Wyo.
Number: twelve. New York suspends the statute while defendant resides in the state under
a false name.
213 Suspension: Ala., Conn., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Va., W.Va. Extension: Ark.
214 Suspension: Va., W.Va.
215 Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., T.H., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo.,
Mont., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number:
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time letters testamentary or of adm~nistration are issued. 216 A similar
one-year period for suit against the estate is allowed when the defendant dies, but again this may be computed from death,217 issuance of
letters testamentary or of administration,218 or either point, whichever
is later.219 A small group of states suspend the operation of the statute
either following the death of the party2 20 or until a representative is
qualified. 221
Most provisions deal with causes which have accrued prior to the
death of a party. Where a cause accrues against the estate after the
death of an individual, suit ordinarily is brought against the executor
or administrator. Five states222 say that where the limitation period is
suspended between death and the appointment of a representative,
such a representative is deemed qualified on causes arising after death
after a period averaging four years has passed after death.

4. Effect of War
Eight states223 suspend operation of the statute on causes of plaintiffs who are enemy aliens. Fourteen states224 suspend the period where
either party is an alien enemy. Several states225 suspend or extend the
statutory period for actions by servicemen, against servicemen, or both
for the duration of a war.
twenty-six. The Arizona provision applies only unless no representative is appointed sooner.
The limitation can be extended only to a maximum of three years after death in Michigan.
The Massachusetts, Michigan and Rhode Island provisions apply if death occurs within a
short time after the normal period terminated.
Colo., Conn., Ky., Me., Mass., Vt.
D.C., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Md., Mich., Miss., R.I. Number: nine. District of
Columbia and Georgia place a maximum extension beyond death.
21s Alaska, Cal., Del., Idaho, III., Ky., Mass., Mont., Nev., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C.,
S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis. Number: eighteen. Kentucky allows suit to be brought
against the heirs if no representative is appointed after death. Nevada, New York and
Montana set special periods where the deceased died outside the state.
210 Me., Minn., Mo., N.Y.
220 Ga., Minn., Tenn., N.J., Tex., Va., Vt. North Carolina suspends during probate.
All but Vermont limit the length of time during which there can be an extension.
221 Ala., Minn., Tenn.
222 Ky., Mont., N.Y., Va., W.Va.
223 Cal., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., N.Y., Vt. The Minnesota statute allows one
year after cessation of hostilities if no more than five years have elapsed since accrual. The
rest suspend operation of the statute.
224 Ala., Alaska, Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C., Utah, Wash.,
W.Va., Wis. The New York statute applies to time of war or occupation. South Dakota
allows no suspension.
225 Ark., III., N.J., Vt., Tex., Wash., Wis.
216

211 Ariz.,
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5. Prevention or Failure of Action

If some paramount authority prohibits plaintiff from enforcing his
claim, or if certain circumstances exist in which enforcement is impossible, the running of the statute is suspended until such time as
plaintiff can commence his action. Prohibition may be by statute226 or
injunction.227 Plaintiff may be unable to bring his action if defendant
conceals the cause of action228 or' if other circumstances beyond plaintiff's control229 make commencement impossible.
If plaintiff begins an action on his claim within the period allowed,
but fails to obtain judgment, many states give him an additional period
after such disposition of his case as the court may make, in order that
he can successfully prosecute his claim to judgment. Judicial determinations resulting in an additional period include reversal of judgment,230
arrest of judgment,231 failure of process or service,232 defeat of the writ
or action by the death of a party233 or a matter of form, 234 nonsuit of
plaintiff,235 or any disposition not cutting off or affecting plaintiff's right
to bring a second action. 236 The usual period of extension is one year.
D. Rules for Applying Time Limitations
The third major category into which provisions of general statutes
226 Ala., Alaska, Cal., D.C., Idaho, ill., Iowa, Miss., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: nineteen. Minnesota allows one year after
removal.
221 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., D.C., T.H., Idaho,.lli., Iowa, Ky., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev.,
N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis. Number: twentysix. Minnesota allows one year after removal.
22s Conn., Ga., T.H., ill., Ind., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo., N.M. (trust),
N.D., R.I., Vt. Number: fifteen. In Mississippi and North Dakota the statute begins to
run from discovery or when the existence of the cause should have been discovered.
2 29 E.g., prevention by officer, Kentucky; by defendant's improper acts, Missouri; fraud,
North Dakota; obstruction by improper means, Virginia, West Virginia; nobody in existence
to sue, Wisconsin.
230 Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., T.H. (real property), Idaho, ill., Ind.,
Kan., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W.Va., Wis., Wyo.
Number: thirty-nine.
231 Ala., Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., T.H. (real property), ill., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo.,
Pa., R.I., Tenn., Vt., Va., W.Va. Number: seventeen.
232 Colo., Conn., Del., Me., Mass., Mich., Vt., Va., W.Va. Number: nine. Also: finding of no jurisdiction, Conn., Ky.; wrong defendant, Conn.
2 33 Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., T.H. (real property), Ind., Me., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo.,
Pa. (real property), R.I., Vt., Va., W.Va. Number: sixteen. Also: marriage of party, Va.,
W.Va.
234 Colo., Conn., Del., Me., Mass., Mich., Miss., Vt. Number: eight. Also: loss or
destruction of papers in first action, Va., W.Va.; failure to provide security for costs, W.Va.
235 Ark., Conn., Ga., ill., Mo., N.C., Ore.
236 Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mont., N.H., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Utah,
W.Va., Wyo. Number: fifteen.
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of limitations fall is that comprising rules for applying all or certain
limitation periods, together with definition and scope of terms used.

I. Application to Specific Categories of Claims
The operation of the statute of limitations may be applied to, or
withheld from, certain groups of claims or persons. In some states the
statute is specifically made applicable to the state itself,237 while other
states enact the traditional sovereign immunity to the running of the
statute into positive law. 238 Some jurisdictions exempt bills, notes and
other evidences of indebtedness ·issued by banks and monied corporations239 or by corporations in general.240 A few states241 define the
scope of application of the statute to equitable or equitable-type actions.
Limitations are applied to claims used in set-off in some states,242 but do
not apply to such claims in other states. 243 The statute is usually made
applicable to joint defendants, 244 joint mortgagors, 245 or joint contractors,246 individually. A few states247 limit individual attempts to circumvent the normal statutory period through private contract limitations.
In three jurisdictions248 a provision of a will calling for the payment of
a barred obligation may be ineffective unless intent to revive the claim is
clear.

2. Definition of "Accrual" or "Arising" of Cause or Claim
A very important definition often found in the statutes is that of the
time when a cause of action is deemed to have accrued, or claim to have
arisen, for it is from that point that the statutory period is computed.
Accrual of actions based on accounts may be at the time of the last
231 Alaska, Cal., Ga., Idaho, Ky., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C.,
N.D., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., W.Va. Number: nineteen.
238 Ala., Ariz., D.C., Fla., Ind., Miss., Ore., Tenn., Va., Wash. Number: ten.
239 Ark., La., Miss., Mo., N.M., N.C., N.D., S.C., S.D., Vt., Wis. Number: eleven.
240 Ala., N.Y.
241 Applies: where not inequitable, Ga.; except for equitable possession of land, Alaska;
where concurrent law-equity jurisdiction, Colo., Miss.
·
242Ark., Colo., Del., Ga., T.H., Me., Miss., N.J., N.Y. (except real property), Okla.,
Utah, Vt., Wis. Number: thirteen. The Arkansas statute applies only to amounts in excess
of plaintiff's claim.
243 ill., Iowa, Mich., Minn., Miss., N.M., S.D. Scope: claims owned by defendant
(Ill., Iowa, Miss.), and unbarred (Ill., Iowa, Mich., Miss.), when plaintiff's cause arose;
malpractice claims used against claim for services (Minn., S.D.).
244 Me., Miss. Georgia does not apply her statute to joint defendants until the disabilities of all are removed.
245 C~.• Idaho, Mont., Utah. Cotenants, N.C.
246 Colo., Mass., Mich., Miss., N.J., Vt., W.Va., Wis.
247 Any attempt: Fla., Kan., Miss., S.C., Va. Shortening the period: Ala., Fla., Tex.
(under two years).
248 D.C., Va., W.Va.
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· item proved on the adverse side,249 of the last item proved on either
side,250 or at the last transaction or payment.251 The cause of action
for recovery of a bank deposit may accrue at demand.252 Actions for a
statutory penalty or a common law liability against corporation directors
or stockholders commonly accrue at the discovery of the facts by the
person aggrieved.253 Real property actions are deemed to have accrued
at disseisin,254 at the death of a predecessor in interest who died seised
or possessed,255 at the termination of an intermediate estate regardless
of a forfeiture or breach of condition giving a right of entry or action,256
at the time of such forfeiture or breach if benefit of them is sought,207
at the time the ancestor or predecessor in interest first gained the right to
title or possession,258 or at any other time when the claimant became
entitled to entry or possession. 259 An action for waste or trespass accrues
only at the time the facts are discovered by plaintiff. 260 Actions seeking
relief based on grounds of fraud261 or mistake262 are deemed to have accrued when the facts constituting such fraud or mistake are discovered
by plaintiff.

3. Commencement of Action
Some definite act of plaintiff is required to halt the running of the
statutory period. More may be required of plaintiff to toll the statute of
limitations than is necessary from a procedural viewpoint to begin an
action. An action may be deemed commenced at the filing of the com249 Mutual, open anil current accounts where demands mutual anil reciprocal: Ky., Mo.
250 Mutual, open anil current accounts where demands mutual anil reciprocal: Alaska,
Cal., Fla., Idaho, Ind., Me., Minn., Mont., Nev., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wash.
Number: sixteen. Alaska, Oregon and Washington require less than a year between entries.
Mutual, open anil current accounts in general: Ala., Ark., Cal., Colo., T.H., Iowa, Mass.,
Mich., Miss., N.M., N.Y., Tenn., Wis. Number: thirteen.
251 Mutual, open and current accounts in general: Ala., Ariz., Tex., Va., W.Va.,
252 Idaho, Mont., N.Y., Va. At insolvency: Cal.
253 Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D., S.C., S.D., Utah, Wis. Georgia and
Washington apply a similar provision to any statutory penalty or forfeiture.
254 Colo., T.H., ill., Me., Mass., Mich.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257Ibid.
25s Colo., T.H., ill., Me., Mass., Mich., N.H.
259 Ala., Colo., T.H., ill., Me., Mass., Mich.
260 Underground trespass to mining claim: Mont., Nev., Ohio, Utah. In general: Iowa.
261 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Md., Minn., Mo.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Va., Wash.,
Wis., Wyo. Number: twenty-nine. Maryland adds when by reasonable diligence it should
have been discovered. Pennsylvania applies a similar provision to fraud raising a resulting
or implied trust.
262 Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Iowa, Ky., Mo., Mont., N.M., N.C., N.D., Utah, Va.
Number: thirteen.
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plaint or petition,263 at the filing of complaint or petition and the issuance of summons or process,264 at the time service is obtained on defendant or a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest with defendant, 265 or at first publication.266 In many jurisdictions
an attempted service of process is the equivalent of actual service if
certain conditions are met. An attempt may be equivalent to service if
plaintiff faithfully and diligently attempts to procure service,267 if process is delivered to an officer with intent that it be served,268 if there
is actual service within sixty days,269 or if first publication occurs within
sixty days. 270
4. Manner of Pleading the Statute
Some jurisdictions provide for the manner in which the bar of the
statute must be pleaded and proved. The statute may be invoked by
answer, 271 by demurrer, 272 as a matter of defense, 273 by motion,274 by
reply2 75 or by any proper manner of raising the issue. 276

5. Revival of Barred Claim
The bar of the statute need not be final. The statute of limitations
is considered a matter of privilege which the defendant must invoke,
and which he may voluntarily waive. An action on an obligation expressed in terms of money payment may usually be revived by an acknowledgment or promise in writing signed by the' person to be
charged,277 or by a part payment of principal or interest by the person
to be charged. 278 An indorsement of payment on a note, bill or other
263 Ala., Cal., Idaho, Mont., N.M., Wash.
264 Alaska, Fla., Kan., Ky., Me., N.C., Tenn.
265Kan., Minn., Neb. (defendant only), N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D.,
Wis., Wyo. Number: twelve.
266 Kan., Neb., Ohio, Okla., Wyo.
267 Kan., Ohio, Okla., Wyo.
268 N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Wis.
269 All courts: Kan., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.D., Wyo. Courts of record: N.Y., Wis.
Courts not of record: due diligence, N.Y., Wis.
270 Kan., N.Y. (court of record), N.D., Okla., Ore., S.D.
211 Mont., N.Y., N.C., N.D., S.C., S.D., Wash., Wis.
212 Wash., Wis.
273 Ariz., Colo. (real property).
274N.Y.
275 Unless not needed to raise the issue, Mont., N.Y.
276 Colo. (real property), La. (real property), Ohio, S.D.
211 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Me.,
Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W.Va., Wis., Wyo. Number: forty.
21s Ala., Alaska, Cal., Colo., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Kan., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo.,
Mont., Neb., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Wash.,
Wis., Wyo. Number: twenty-nine
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writing may be insufficient evidence of such payment.279 Such a promise280 or payment:2 81 by one joint defendant does not affect rights underthe .statute accruing to his fellows. After an acknowledgment or payment of a barred claim, plaintiff may either be restricted to suit on the
original cause of action282 or allowed to sue on either the old cause or
the new promise. 283

6. Requirements for Extension or Suspension
Not all disabilities of those falling within the terms of the statute
give plaintiff the benefit of a longer period for suit. The disabilities of
plaintiff must exist at the accrual of the cause or the arising of the
claim;284 successive disabilities cannot be tacked. 285 When two or more
disabilities co-exist at the time of accrual or arising, all must be removed before the limitations attach. 286

7. Borrowing Provisions
For conflict-of-laws purposes, the general statutes of limitations are
considered procedural, so that the forum applies its own statute without
regard to the limitation period of the place where the cause arose. However, in order to eliminate some of the foreign plaintiffs who seek the
most favorable statute of limitations available, many states have enacted
"borrowing statutes" which in effect borrow the limitation period of the
state where the cause of action arose or claim accrued, if that period is
shorter than the forum period. An action may be barred if it would be
barred where the cause of action arose, 287 where the cause arose and defendant resided,288 where defendant resided, 289 or· where the cause
arose and all parties resided.290 A preferred position may be given to
279 Ark, Colo., Ind., Me., Mass., Mich., N.J., Vt., Wis. Number: nine.
280 Ark., Colo., Ga., Ind., Me., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo., N.J., Vt., Va., W.Va., Wis.
Number: fourteen. Same by partner after dissolution of partnership, Ga., N.C., S.C.
281 Ark., Colo., Ind., Me., Mass., Mich., N.J., Wis.
2s2 Ga., S.C.
288 Va., W.Va.
284 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ky., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev.,
N.M. (real property), N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wash., Wis.
Number: twenty-five.
285 Ariz., Mass., Mich., N.M. (real property), Tex.
286 Ala., Alaska, Ark., Cal., Idaho, Ky., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.C., N.D.,
Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Wash., Wis. Number: twenty.
287 Colo., Fla., lli., Ky., Mo., Neb., Ohio, Pa., Wyo. Number: nine. Nebraska largely
nullified its statute by including only those claims which would be barred had defendant
resided in Nebraska for its limitation period.
288 Miss., Okla.
289 Ala., Ariz., Ind., Iowa.
200 Alaska, Kan., Me., Mass., Ore., R.I., Tenn., Wash.
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residents of the forum state by excepting causes accruing to such residents and held by them from accrual. 291 Similar borrowing provisions·
may apply to actions on judgments rendered in foreign courts,292 or
actions on contracts executed in other states.293

III
SURVEY OF FEDERAL LIMITATIONS

A. Actions Involving the United States
The United States Code contains many limitations on actions
brought against the United States. Every civil action against the United
States is barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the
right of action first accrued. 294 A tort claim against the United States
is barred unless action is brought within two years after accrual of the
claim. 295 Small tort claims which may be settled by administrative
officers296 must be presented within two years after accrual. 297 Claims
under the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims must be filed, or referred
by the Senate, House of Representatives or the head of an executive
department, within six years after the claim accrues.298 Claims or demands against the United States cognizable by the General Accounting
Office, except those of a state, territory, possession or the District of
Columbia, must be submitted to the Office within ten years after the
claim or demand accrues. 299 Meritorious claims not subject to adjustment under existing appropriations may be submitted to Congress by
291 Cal., Del., Idaho, Minn., Mont., Nev., N.Y., Utah.
292 Ariz., D.C., Ky., La., Okla., Va., W.Va.
293 La., Va., W.Va.
294 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §240l(a). Any person under a legal disability is
given three years to bring his action after the disability is removed. Because the limitations
on raising tax questions under the Internal Revenue Code seem primarily a matter of fiscal
policy, they have been omitted.
29°28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §240l(b). A temporary one year period was allowed
for claims accruing prior to enactment of the section.
296 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §2672. These
claims must be under $1000.
29728 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §240l(b). If written notice is given within the
period, action is not barred until six months after the claim is withdrawn or a notice of final
disposition is mailed by the agency.
298 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §2501. Actions by persons under a legal disability or
beyond seas when the claim accrues may be brought within three years after the disability
or absence terminates. Claims by oyster growers growing out of river-harbor improvement
projects must be brought within two years of the termination of the operation responsible.
299 31 U.S.C. (1946) §7la. Persons serving in the armed forces who acquired a claim
after, or had had a claim less than five years when war was declared, are allowed five years
after cessation of hostilities. For this purpose the Joint Resolution of July 25, 1947, 61 Stat.
L. 451, is considered termination of the war.
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the Comptroller-General,300 but such claims must be presented in writing within ten years after the claim accrues.301 Claims for personal
property left on a Veterans Administration facility3° 2 or left by a person
dying as an inmate of a Veterans Administration facility3° 3 must be
brought within 6.ve years of notice of sale of such property.304 A person
who fails to claim a pension for the period of three years is presumed to
have terminated eligibility and must reapply for reinstatement on the
rolls. 305 Claims against the Alien Property Custodian concerning property held by him must be brought within two years after the vesting
of the property.306
Relatively few non-criminal actions by the United States are subject to limitations. The government may sue for a forfeiture of $2000
and double the loss of the government when there has been a false or
fraudulent claim against the United States or a false or fraudulent procurement of government property, provided that such action is brought
within six years of the act in question. 307 Where suit is brought for any
pecuniary penalty or forfeiture of property under the customs laws, it
must be within 6.ve years from the discovery of the alleged offense.808
The federal district attorney of the district where the Hours of Service
Act for railroad employees is violated may recover a 6.ne for the violation within one year.809 The government may sue to vacate a patent
of land within six years. 310
B. Private Actions Based on Federal Statute
Prior to 1948 many important private actions based on violations of
federal regulatory statutes were not limited. By revisions in 1948 limitations have been placed on actions under several important federal statutes. Actions under the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act,311 the Fair Labor
800 31 u.s.c. (1946) §236.
80131 U.S.C. (1946) §§237, 71a. The attorney-general is allowed to settle claims
under $1000 of persons employed in federal penal institutions if the claim is presented in
writing within one year of the occurrence of the accident or incident out of which the claim
arises. 31 U.S.C. (1946) §238. Cf. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §2672.
so2 38 U.S.C. (1946) §l6a(d).
303 38 u.s.c. (1946) §16£.
804 H claimant is under a disability, he may sue within :6.ve years after the termination
of the disability.
805 38 u.s.c. (1946) §53.
306 50 U.S.C. App. (1946) §34(b).
807 31 u.s.c. (1946) §235.
30819 U.S.C. (1946) §1621. Time during which the cause is concealed or defendant or the property is absent from the United States is not reckoned in the period.
309 45 u.s.c. (1946) §63.
310 43 u.s.c. (1946) §1166.
s1129 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §257ff.
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Standards Act as amended,312 the Walsh-Healey Act,313 and the BaconDavis Act,314 must be brought within two years after the accrual of the
action. 315 A limitation of three years from the day the cause of action
accrues has been placed on actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 316 Under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act:3 17 the right to compensation for disability or for death is
lost unless a claim is filed within one year from the date of the injury or
death, or in case of payments without award, from the last payment.
Actions under the Suits in Admiralty Act:3 18 must be brought within
two years of the time the cause of action arises, and under the Death on
the High Seas by Wrongful Action Act:3 19 within two years after the
wrongful act.
Fairly uniform provision has been made for actions by and against
carriers. A two year limitation is placed on actions by the carrier for
charges or against the carrier for overcharges in interstate commerce
when the carrier is a railroad, 320 a motor carrier,321 a water carrier,322
or a freight forwarder. 323 A similar limitation of one year is imposed on
actions by and against telephone, telegraph, or radiotelephone companies. 324 In all these actions accrual is at delivery or tender of delivery.
Causes of action are often created for the recovery of fines, penalties and forfeitures by a private individual aggrieved because of violations of federal law. The only statute dealing in general terms with such
recoveries places a limit of five years after the accrual of the claim in
which action may be brought. 325 However, by decision this has been
restricted to strictly public wrongs, and does not cover actions to redress
private wrongs, even though the wrongful act also constituted a public
wrong. 326 But the companion section enacted in 1948 provides that
312 29 U.S.C. (1946) §20lff.
313 41 u.s.c. (1946) §§35-45.
814 40 U.S.C. (1946) §§276a-276a-5.
315 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §255. This applies to actions accruing after May
14, 1947. Actions on causes accruing prior to that time were limited to either two years or
the appropriate state statute of limitations, whichever was shorter.
310 45 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §56.
317 33 u.s.c. (1946) §913.
818 46 u.s.c. (1946) §§741, 745.
819 46 U.S.C. (1946) §§761, 763. If no jurisdiction may be obtained over the vessel
in the two year period, action may be brought within ninety days after such jurisdiction is
obtained.
32049 u.s.c. (1946) §16(3).
32149 U.S.C. (1946) §304a.
322 49 u.s.c. (1946) §908.
323 49 U.S.C. (1946) §1006a.
324 47 u.s.c. (1946) §415.
325 28 U .s.c. (1948) §2462.
326 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 35 S.Ct. 238 (1915). The section
was held inapplicable to the Fair Labor Standards Act [Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
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any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture prescribed for a violation of a statute
without mode of recovery being provided for may be recovered in a
civil action.327 This was intended "to clarify a serious ambiguity in existing law."328 Despite the restrictive interpretation placed on the older
section, there seems little reason why the two sections should not be construed as coextensive, since the need for both mode of recovery and limitation of recovery seems clear, and since the descriptive language is
identical in both sections. Particular limitations on recovery of fines,
penalties or forfeitures include those for violation of the Rent Control
Act3 29 and for usurious interest charged by national banks.330
The statutes dealing with regulation of securities and exchanges
provide causes of action for persons injured or damaged when regulatory
measures are not complied with. The common limitation is within one
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action, or
after the time when the facts should have been discovered, the maximum being three years after the actual accrual of the cause of action.
Such actions may result from a false registration of a security or trust
indenture,331 from a misrepresentation in a document filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission or a statement or omission resulting in such a misrepresentation,332 or from any violation of the Securities Exchange Act.333
Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act a receiver or trustee within two
years after the adjudication of bankruptcy or within any further time
allowed by federal or state law may sue on any claim against which the
state or federal statute of limitations had not expired at the time the
petition of bankruptcy was filed. 3 The operation of the statute of limitations of the United States or of any state affecting. any debt of the
bankrupt is suspended from the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy until (a) thirty days from an order denying the discharge, (b)
thirty days after the filing of a vvaiver of discharge or the entry of an

?:

.Co. (D.C. Iowa 1945) 58 F. Supp. 915], or to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §1,
[Chattanooga Foundry Co. v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 27 S.Ct. 65 (1906)].
327 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §2461.
328 Reviser's Notes to section 2461. "Numerous sections in the United States Code
prescribe civil fines, penalties, and pecuniary forfeitures for violation of certain sections
without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof." Ibid.
329 One year. 50 U.S.C. App. (1946) §1895.
330 Two years. 12 U.S.C. (1946) §86.
33115 U.S.C. (1946) §§77k, 77l, 77m. Accrues at bona Sde offer to public under
77k or 77l(l) or at sale under 77l(2).
33215 U.S.C. (1946) §77www. Accrues at filing of such document.
33315 U.S.C. (1946) §78i(e).
334 11 U.S.C. (1946) §29(e).
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order providing for loss of the discharge, 335 or (c) thirty days after a
dismissal of bankruptcy proceedings. 336 Actions against a person having
acted as a trustee in bankruptcy or as a receiver arising during his administration may be brought within two years after the estate is
closed.337 Actions on the bond of a referee338 or a receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy339 must be brought within two years.
Actions on the bond of any United States officer or official disbursing or chargeable with public monies must be brought against the surety
within five years after liability appears upon the account submitted by
such officer.340 • Action on the bond of a United States marshal must be
brought within six years after the right accrues. 341

C. Suspension, Extension and Application of Limitations
The only blanket suspension of all statutes of limitations, state and
federal, is found in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. 342 The
period of service in the armed forces is not computed in any limitation
period on an action by or against any person in military service, or his
heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, whether or not the cause accrued prior to or during the period of service. No part of the period
after the passage of the act is to be included in computing the period of
redemption for real property sold or forfeited to enforce an obligation,
tax or assessment. 343 However, when the United States commences a
criminal, equitable or legal action under the Sherman Act,344 statutes of
limitation are suspended in favor of any private right of action arising
under the anti-trust laws and based in whole or in part on any matter
complained of in such proceeding. One should also compare the temporary suspension of state and federal limitations during pendency of
bankruptcy proceedings. 345 All of these suspensions rest on some primary federal constitutional delegation of power.
Specific limitations on federally-created rights commonly are ex885 If a corporation has made no application for discharge within six months, suspension
lasts until thirty days after the expiration of such period.
836 11 u.s.c. (1946) §29(f).
387 11 U.S.C. (1946) §29(d).
888 11 U.S.C. (1946) §78(l). Accrual is at date of breach.
880 11 U.S.C. (1946) §78(m). Accrual is at discharge of the individual.
8406 u.s.c. (1946) §5.
84128 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §544. Action may be brought within three years
after the removal of a legal disability.
842 50 U.S.C. App. (1946) §525. Cf. 31 U.S.C. (1946) §§7la, 237.
343 Except under 26 U.S.C. (1946) §527, Internal Revenue Code.
844 15 u.s.c. (1946) §16.
845 11 u.s.c. (1946) §29(£).
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tended in case of a legal disability3 46 or when no property can be found
within the United States.347
There is no general restriction on the right to shorten a limitation
period by private contract. However, persons in control of sea-going
vessels are prohibited from contracting to limit the time for giving notice
or £ling claims for loss of life or bodily injury to less than six months, or
for commencing suit to less than one year from the date of death or
injury.348 Carriers are forbidden to contract away liability imposed on
them for loss of, or damage or injury to, property carried by them or
connecting carriers.349
Although state limitations are applied by federal courts where no
federal limitations are provided on federally-created rights, in only two
places have the state statutes been specifically incorporated into federal
statute. A state statute limiting recovery of land is applied when an
action is brought by a patentee or his successor for possession, rents or
profits of land patented in severalty to members of Indian tribes pursuant to treaty.350 State statutes shorter than two years were applied to
causes accruing prior to May 14, 1947 under the Portal-to-Portal Pay
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey Act or the BaconDavis Act.351

IV
SuGGESTED REVERSAL OF CONFLICTS RuLE

In the Anglo-American legal system, the general statute of limitations is considered a matter going to the remedy and not to the right,852
though on the Continent it is considered as substantive and thus directly
affecting the right. 353 However, the common law system does recognize
as substantive a statute creating a right unknovvn to the common law
346 E.g., 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §§544, 2401, 2501.
347E.g., 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §2462; 46 U.S.C. (1946) §763.
348 46 U.S.C. (1946) §183b. Such provisions are inapplicable to a minor, insane person or a decedent's estate until a legal representative is appointed, if such appointment is
within three years.
349 49 u.s.c. (1946) §20(11).
350 25 u.s.c. (1946) §377.
35129 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §255. See notes 314-318, incl., supra.
352 3 RABEL, THE CoNI'LICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 495 (1950); WESTLAKE, PRIVATE forrER.i."l'ATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., §238 (1922); GooDRICH, CoNI'LICT OF
LAws, 3d ed., §85 (1949); STORY, CoNI'LICT oF LAws §476; 1 WooD ON LIMITATIONS,
4th ed., §8 (1916).
.
353 3 RABEL, THE CoNFLICT oP LAws: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 493 (1950); WESTLAKE, PRIVATE lNTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 310 (1922); Kuhn, "Doctrines of Private
International Law in England and America Contrasted With Those of Continental Europe,"
12 CoL. L. REv. 44, 53 (1912).
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which purports to cut off the right after a certain period of time has
elapsed; courts still recognize the distinction when dealing with such
statutes as the wrongful death act.35 ,i Historically the development of
this approach is understandable. English law had developed without
contact with conflicting foreign systems of law,355 developing its own
court system and procedure, including limitations on access to the
courts.356 When foreign causes did come before the English courts,
foreign law was viewed with suspicion, and restricted in its application
as much as possible. Except when faced with a statute clearly purported
to cut off a cause of action unknown to English law, English judges
characterized statutes of limitation as going to the remedy; since the
foreigner was deemed to take the English courts as he found them,
English statutes of limitation were applied. 357 Early United States
judges358 and writers359 adopted the English doctrine, although not
without dissent.360
Lending strength to this early, restrictive approach was the comity
theory, espoused by Justice Story,361 which called for application of only
such foreign law as the state as a civilized nation thought necessary.
But within the past 6.fty years new concepts of the relation of local and
foreign law have been evolved. By the vested rights theory the law of
the state where the cause of action arose is deemed to create a right
which should be recognized by every other jurisdiction.362 By the local
354 GoonmcH, CoNFLICT oF LA.ws, 3d ed., §86 (1949); STORY, CoNFLICT oF LA.ws
§582; 1 Woon ON LIMITATIONS, 4th ed., §9 (1916).
355 Lorenzen, "The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws," 28 YALE L.J., 492
(1919); Kuhn, "Doctrines of Private International Law in England and America Contrasted
With Those of Continental Europe," 12 Cot. L. REv. 44 (1912).
35GWainford v. Barker, 1 Ld. Raym. 232, 91 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1697); Anonymous, 1
Salk. 154, 91 Eng. Rep. 142 (1707); Quantock v. England, 5 Burr. 2628, 98 Eng. Rep.
382 (1770).
357Dupleix v. DeRoven, 2 Vern. 540, 23 Eng. Rep. 950 (1705); Williams v. Jones,
13 East. 439, 104 Eng. Rep. 441 (1811); British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903,
109 Eng. Rep. 683 (1830); Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. (N.C.) 203, 132 Eng. Rep. 80
(1835).
358 Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caines (N.Y.) 402 (1803); Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84
(1806); Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 263 (1808); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet.
(38 U.S.) 312 (1839).
359 Notably STORY, CoNFLICT OF LA.ws.
360 Livingston, J., dissenting in Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caines (N.Y.) 402 (1803); Maryland v. Todd, (C.C. Ind. 1854) Fed. Case No. 9220, 16 Fed. Cas. 996; Baker v. Stonebraker's Adm'r., 36 Mo. 338 (1865); Rathbone v. Coe, 6 Dak. 91, 50 N.W. 620 (1888);
Finnell v. Railway, (C.C. Mo. 1888) 33 F. 427, contra on same statute, Morgan v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 5l"Mo. App. 523 (1892).
361 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §38. See criticism in Cook, "The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public
Policy, and the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
ao2 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Walsh v. New
York & New England R. Co., 160 Mass. 571, 36 N.E. 584 (1894); Slater v. Mexican
National Rys., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1903).

990

MICHIGAN LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 49

law theory the forum applies a rule of decision identical or nearly so
with the rule of decision which would be applied in the state where
some or all of the operative facts occurred.363 Under the influence of
these new approaches, many matters formerly thought of as procedural
have come to be considered substantive, so that the law of the state
where the operative facts occur is applied in preference to forum ,
law. 364 The treatment of the general statute of limitations remains an
anomalous segment of provincialism in a framework essentially interjurisdictional in its modem development. It is difficult to conceive of
a right without a remedy, or of a right not derived from a governmental
unit. 365 If the forum state "recognizes" a foreign right while at the same
time applying its own statute of limitations, it is in effect creating a
new right, and adjusting the relative position of the parties on the
basis of a relationship which did not in fact or contemplation of law
arise within the forum. 366 It is submitted that American courts should
abandon the long-standing procedural approach to this problem and
recognize that in fact a general statute of limitations, as well as· a
special statute of limitations such as that on the wrongful death act,
affects the right, and not merely the remedy. 367 As a result, a foreign
363 Cook, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy, and the ConB.ict o_f Laws," 33 YALE L.J.
736 (1924).
864 See Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L.J. 333
(1933); cf. Ailes, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws," 39 Mi:cH. L. RBv.
392 (1941). Statutes and rules considered by more recent cases to be substantive include
the statute of frauds [GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §88 (1949); Lorenzen, ''The
Statute of Frauds and the ConB.ict of Laws," 32 YALE L.J. 311 (1923)]; parol evidence rule
[GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §89 (1949)]; wrongful death act [Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918)]; survival statute [Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn.
174, 139 A. 691 (1928); Friedman v. Greenburg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 166 A. 119 (1933);
contra, Chase v. Ormsby, (3d Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 521]; married woman's disability to
sue husband [Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934); Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203
Wis. 248, ·234 N.W. 342 (1931); contra, Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. (2d) 597
(1936) holding it procedural]; measure of damages [GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d
ed., §90 (1949)].
365 "An immortal right to bring an eternally prohibited action is a metaphysical subtlety
that the present writer cannot pretend to understand." AMBs, LBCTURBs ON LEGAL HxsTORY 199 (1913). Cf. Holt, C.J., in Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953, 92 Eng. Rep.
126 (1703): "If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate
and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed
it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for ••• want of right and want of
remedy are reciprocal."
.
366 WEsTLAXB, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., 310-312 (1922).
367 Accord: 3 RABEL, THB CONFLICTS OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 521 (1950);
Lorenzen, "The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws," 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919);
WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., §238 (1922); GOODRICH, CoNFLICT
OF LAws, 3d ed., §85 (1949); Holmes, J. in Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692
(1904). Contra: Ailes, "Limitation of Actions and the ConB.ict of Laws," 31 MrcH. L.
RBv. 474 (1933).
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statute of limitations should be given the same force in the forum state
as it would be in the state where the cause of action arose.
Two different situations would arise to be dealt with under a substantive approach. The first occurs when the forum statute is longer
than the statute of the state where the operative facts occurred. It is
here that the ill effects of the present rule are most apparent, for it is to
avoid the shorter limitation period of the place where the cause of action
arises that plaintiff shops around for a longer period in which to sue.
When the forum recognizes a shorter statute of limitations, most of the
incentive to shop will be gone. The forum statute will be construed to
extend only to causes arising within the forum, and the shorter foreign
statute will be applied. 368 The second arises when the foreign statute is
longer than the forum statute. Logicallyrif the foreign statute affects the
cause when it is shorter than the forum period, it also affects the cause
when it is longer.To recognize the shorter statute recognizes a right in defendant protecting him from being sued beyond a certain time; to recognize the longer period recognizes a correlative right in plaintiff allowing
him to sue for a given number of years. Yet it is this second situation which
early courts and writers found most abhorrent, because of the possibility of immeasurably stale or perpetually vital causes being brought in
from foreign jurisdictions.369 Though in light of modern conflicts developments such objections should be considered far-fetched and without merit, there is room to protect tender local feelings within a substantive approach to the general statutes of limitations. By accepted
conflicts principles, no foreign right repugnant to the public policy of
the forum need be recognized; access to the courts will be denied to .
such causes.370 Even though the general statute of limitations can be
considered as affecting only causes a~ising within the jurisdiction, it can
also be considered if a court so chooses as a legislative determination that
368 Story in LeRoy v. Crowninshield, (C.C. Mass. 1820), Fed. Case No. 8269, 15 Fed.
Cas. 362, thought this should be the law in such a situation, although he felt himself bound
by precedent; he had changed his mind by the time he published his work on the conflict

~1-

.

"Every nation must have a right to settle for itself the times ••• within ••• which
suits shall be litigated in its own courts. There can be no pretense to say that foreigners are
entitled to crowd the tribunals of any nation with suits of their own which are stale and
antiquated, to the exclusion of the common administration of justice between its own subjects." STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAws §578. See also Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84 (1808);
Nash v. Tupper, I Caines (N.Y.) 402 (1803).
370 "[Courts] do not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal." Cardozo, J. in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, lll, 120 N.E.
198 (1918). See GOODRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §§ll, 97 (1949); Lorenzen,
"The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws," 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919).
369
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injustice will be worked by the enforcement of stale claims, or that the
judicial system of the state is inadequate to dispose of such ancient
causes. This policy would not be violated when the foreign statute
cutting off the right in a shorter period of time than the forum statutory
period is recognized, but it could result in the withholding of the aid
of the forum courts in the enforcement of the claim when the period is
longer. Although this public policy approach will restrict the full
effectiveness of a recognition of the substantive aspect of the general
statute of limitations,371 it does serve to protect local interests while at
the same time reducing the worst features of inter-jurisdictional shopping. In light of modern developments in application of special statutes
of limitation, whether longer or shorter than comparable forum states,
all courts could in time come tQ apply the foreign statute in all cases.372
Treatment accorded a cause of action thus would be the same in any
jurisdiction. This in turn would remedy the undesirable lack of uniformity between federal districts resulting from the state-federal uniformity requirement of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, for if treatment of a
cause is the same in all state courts, it will then be uniform in all
federal courts. ·

V
PROPOSED FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES

A. Proposed Federal Statutes
There is no constitutional barrier which prevents Congress from
enacting a statute of limitations covering federally-created rights. No
constitutional mandate requires that state limitations be adopted when
federal rights are enforced in either state courts or federal district courts.
Nor can one find any policy in favor of letting state limitations fill a
vacuum created by the failure of Congress to limit the time in which
action on a federally-created right may be brought. Since such rights
are enforceable throughout the country, they should be enforceable
within the same period of time. No longer should the length of time in
371 See 3 RA:sEL, THE CoNPLICT oF LAws: A CoMPARAnvE STUDY 513-516 (1950).
"A public policy, not strong enough to be enforced by the court except when pleaded by the
defendant should not be a reason to shield one who changes his abode arbitrarily to the
forum, nor should it be a ground to remove limitation from many other important incidents
of the governing law." Id. at 514.
372 For such an enlightened treatment of a special statute of limitations see Lewis v.
R.F.C., (D.C. Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 654, and in same spirit, Young v. United States,
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 587. Contra, McMillen v. Douglas Aircraft Corp., (D.C.
Cal. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 670; Hartwell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1950) 92 F.
Supp. 271. All cases deal with wrongful death statutes.
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which one defendant can be sued differ according to the jurisdiction in
which he may be found, nor should it differ from the time in which a
defendant in a similar action may be sued where that defendant is found.
As indicated in the survey of existing federal limitations, Congress has
closed many of the more obvious gaps,373 making state limitations, many
of them passed for the purpose of limiting such federal rights, unnecessary. Two primary tasks remain to be accomplished. The first is a conscious correlation of existing federal limitations, with similar types of action being limited to the same period of time. 374 One possibility would
be to incorporate a general statute of limitations in Title 28 of the Code,
with reference being made to the appropriate limitation whenever the
Code creates or recognizes a right of action in a private individual. The
second is a general residuary limitation, perhaps broken down into specific types of action such as contract, tort, or recovery of penalty, covering any federally-created right not specially limited by Congress. The
language used should be broad, with adequate reviser's notes to discourage a restrictive judicial treatment of the provision.375 In this manner,
by a careful correlation of existing limitations and a residual clause designed to cover actions for which no special limitation is deemed
necessary, there should be no reason to apply varying state limitations
periods to federal causes enforced in state and federal courts throughout
the United States.

B. Proposed State Statutes
The evils which have grown out of inter-jurisdictional shopping
cannot be eliminated by Congress alone. Congress can provide time
limitations for federally-created rights, but cannot fix time limitations
for state-created rights. While it is true that Congress can limit the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts,376 and it is conceivable that
the courts' diversity jurisdiction could be limited to actions commenced
within a specified time after accrual, such a solution is not desirable.
Any such legislation might be considered by the Supreme Court to be
an evasion of the constitutional doctrine laid down in Erie Railroad 11.
Tompkins. But the most undesirable features of such a jurisdictional ap37s E.g.,
374This

45 U.S.C. (Supp. ID, 1950) §56; 29 U.S.C. (Supp. ID, 1950) §255.
has been done in certain titles of the United States Code; e.g. 49 U.S.C.
(Transportation); 15 U.S.C. (Commerce and Trade); but should be carried out throughout
the Code.
375 To avoid a treatment such as that accorded the present 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ID, 1950)
§2462. See note 326.
376 Analogous, perhaps to requirements of admiralty jurisdiction. See Panama Ry. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391 (1924); The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 55 S.Ct.
31 (1934).
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proach stem from its rigidity. If jurisdictional, the statute could not be
waived by the parties, nor could a barred claim be revived by individual
action. Private persons could not limit jurisdiction by contracting for
a shorter limitation period, or confer jurisdiction by contracting for a
longer period. Furthermore, the basic uniformity requirement of Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins is sound policy so far as state-created rights are
concerned, even though language placing the requirement on a constitutional basis poses some difficulty. Any congressional attempt to remedy the problem of conllicting state statutes of limitations on statecreated rights would prove extremely unsatisfactory. As a result, the
solution of the underlying problem must rest with state legislatures.
The most desirable state remedial action377 would be the adoption
of uniform legislation. Two statutes might be utilized: (a) a uniform
"borrowing" statute; or (b) a uniform statute of limitations. A ''borrowing" statute basically adopts the shorter limitation period of the state
where the cause of action arose to bar action in the forum state on that
cause. So long as the statute of limitations is considered pro~edural in
nature, there is no constitutional requirement for recognition of any
foreign limitation period, and adoption of such borrowing legislation
rests solely on recognition of the sound policy underlying such statutes.
Although thirty-one states now have borrowing legislation of some kind,
a great many of them are undesirable, being limited in scope. Some
statutes apply the foreign period only if the defendant resided in the
foreign jurisdiction throughout the period. 378 This is designed primarily to protect the plaintiff when the defendant either injures plaintiff
while defendant is temporarily within the jurisdiction where the cause
of action arises or removes from the state before the limitation period has
expired. Such an exception seems unwarranted today. Benefit to the
plaintiff from defendant's absence from the jurisdiction should be
strictly limited, for in most instances a plaintiff can discover the whereabouts of his absent debtor; even though a particular plaintiff cannot,
there is a considerable public interest in having all claims settled as
quickly as possible which should prevail even though individual hardship should result. Furthermore, with expanded concepts of contacts
with the state for the purpose of out-of-state service of process379 and
377 Other than the reversal of the conflicts rule by judicial action, supra pp. 988-992.
378 Story desired to engraft such a requirement on statutes limiting action on a statutory
right. STORY, CoNFLICT OP LAws §582b. See Huber v. Steiner, 2 Bing. (N.C.) 203, 132
Eng. Rep. 80 (1835), citing Story with approval. No recent case has adopted this view.
879E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927); Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553 (1935); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339 (1940).
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with quasi-in rem jurisdiction over property within the state,380 plaintiffs have sufficient enforcement machinery available so that they need
not be allowed to rest until events transpire allowing them to sue a defendant newly in funds or newly discovered without effort on their part.
A second exception carved out from some existing borrowing statutes
favors causes of action held from accrual by residents of the forum state.
If the purpose of the statute of limitations is to bar stale claims, it is
difficult to justify degrees of staleness depending upon the domicile of
the claimant. A uniform borrowing statute should provide in simple
terms that a cause of action barred by the statute of the state where it
arose or accrued will be barred in the forum. 381 The effect of such a
statute would be that the right to bring action on a claim would not survive beyond the bar of the place where the operative facts occurred,
though it might be barred in a particular jurisdiction at an earlier time.
Much of the shopping among jurisdictions would be eliminated, although there would still be some choice of forum possible within the
period of limitatio11:s of the state where the cause of action arose. Due
to the fact that federal district courts would have to follow state practice,
there would be an indirect result of bringing about greater uniformity
among federal districts.
The borrowing statute corrects the situation between a particular
plaintiff and defendant only when the foreign statute is shorter than the
forum statute, and does not affect the situation when the foreign statute
is longer than the forum statute. It does not solve the discrepancy when
like causes of action are litigated between different parties in different
jurisdictions.· From an objective viewpoint it is difficult to justify statutes which allow suit against one defendant when suit against a similar
defendant is barred in another jurisdiction, or which bar one plaintiff
when a plaintiff on a similar cause could still bring action in another
jurisdiction. The apparent disinclination of legislatures to correlate
their general statutes of limitations with those of sister states seems
a holdover of provincial English and colonial attitudes toward limitation of actions unwarranted in a day when geographical boundaries no
longer restrict personal and business activities. The tendency to copy
matters of substantive law3 82 and matters of procedure383 is not reflected
380 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
381 Rabel would borrow

U.S. 714 (1877).
the foreign statute as an exclusive limitation, whether longer
or shorter than the forum statute, thus codifying the desirable susbtantive approach to the
statute of limitations. 3 RABEL, THE CoNFLicr oF LAws: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 522
(1950).
382 E.g., uniform statutes proposed by the Committee on Uniform Legislation of the
American Bar Association.
383 E.g., procedural rules modeled after the federal rules of civil procedure.
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where general statutes of limitations are concerned.384 Though inconvenience to individual plaintiffs or defendants attributable to unrelated
statutes of limitations has been evidenced since colonial times,385 it has
taken Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to point up the over-all national need
for correlation of statutes of limitation. The best "correlation" is "uniformity."
Therefore it is suggested that a uniform statute of limitations be
drawn up and submitted to the states for adoption. The specific time
limitations desirable are beyond the scope of this article. They should,
however, be arrived at in light of statistics showing the number of
causes of action sued on in each year subsequent to the accrual of a
particular type of claim. 386 However, a few general observations on the
content of such a statute may be in order.
First, the limitations should be few in number and broad in scope.
Specialized provisions encourage and even necessitate refined judicial
construction, resulting in a likelihood of conflicting interpretation
among the several jurisdictions.387 Actions limited might include those
on contracts, on judgments, for fines, penalties 9r forfeitures, for injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract, for
recovery of real property, for injury to real property, for recovery of, or
injury to, personal property, and for relief based on grounds of fraud or
mistake. A residuary provision for all actions not otherwise provided
for should be included.
· Second, provisions defining adverse possession and otherwise dealing with acquisition of property or property i_nterests by prescription
should be removed from the general statutes of limitation and placed in
the body of statutory material dealing with conveyancing. 388 Although
such provisions were logically included in early statutes of limitation
aimed primarily at real property actions, they no longer serve a functional
purpose in a general statute of limitations in which limitations on personal actions usually outnumber limitations concerning real property.
Third, the state should be subjected to the same period of limitations
as would a private party under the same circumstances. The concept
of sovereign immunity to suit seems unwarranted today, and the states
should follow the lead of the federal government, which has made itself
384 Compare the widespread adoption of the general statute of limitations drawn up in
connection with the procedural reform of the Field Code in 1848.
385 E.g. cases note 358.
386 The average limitations shown in the Appendix to this article may throw some light
on possible limitation periods, although they may tend to be too long.
387 The treatment of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law is an example.
388 Appropriate cross-references should be provided.
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subject to suit in tort when a private individual would be so subject, in
the Federal Tort Claims Act.389
Fourth, provisions calling for suspension or extension of the normal
limitation period should be reduced to a minimum. Though suspension
or extension for some or all legal disabilities of plaintiff is common to
most jurisdictions, today it is possible to have a legal representative appointed who is as fully capable of protecting or asserting the legal rights
of the person incapacitated as the individual himself, making the need
for such provisions doubtful. Nor should the common suspension in
case of one imprisoned on a criminal charge or in execution of a criminal sentence be retained in any jurisdiction where such a prisoner does
not lose the right to maintain an action in the courts.390 Although a
suspension during time of war of limitations of actions involving either
enemy aliens or servicemen may be desirable, such suspension could
well be left to Congress as a war measure,391 and not be retained as a
permanent part of the state statutes of limitations. Since most failures to
assert a claim against an absentee defendant may be attributed more to
plaintiff's lack of initiative than to defendant's elusiveness, the absence provision should be severely limited in scope. The suspension or
extension resulting from absence or concealment of the defendant
should be operative only when defendant leaves no property behind
which can be attached, or when he cannot be sued under expanded concepts permitting out-of-state service of process. Because of the nullifying effect of such absence provisions upon a borrowing statute, a maximum period of suspension or extension, preferably, quite short, should
be provided. An extension of one year after the death of a party to an
action should be enough in which to allow a second action to be brought.
An additional period for suit after an unsuccessful initial attempt to
assert a claim should be allowed only when the disposition of the :first
case is not directed to the merits or does not result from a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff. The period in which the second
action may be brought should be brief, perhaps much shorter than the
one year commonly allowed today.
Fifth, exceptions from the operation of the statute, other than necessary suspension or extension of the statute where it otherwise normally
389 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §2674. Cf. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §2401, civil
actions, and 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §2501, claims within the jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims.
390 On the practical side a prisoner may hesitate to enforce a claim when the fact of
his prisoner status may be brought out to his detriment. But this may also occur after release.
A prisoner also is handicapped in finding and attaching or levying on defendant's property
in satisfaction of his claim.
391 Such as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. (1946) §525.
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applies, should be few; and perhaps should be eliminated entirely. Statutory actions otherwise limited are obviously excepted from the operation of the general statute of limitations. The statute should be applied
to causes asserted in counterclaim. 392 In light of the broad relief provisions and the merger of law and equity of either code or rule type procedure, the statute should be phrased in terms of relief sought, and
should be applied without regard to old law-equity distinctions.393 The
statute should be appli~d to joint defendants individually so long as
there are suspensive provisions applicable to individual defendants.
Sixth, there should be a uniform definition of "arising" or "accrual"
of the "cause" or "claim." So far as possible, accrual should be defined
in general terms, and not related to individual causes of action. The
Missouri provision for accrual in general, deeming a cause accrued
when damage has become ascertainable after breach so that relief may
be full and complete, might be desirable, though it does leave considerable leeway for judicial interpretation.
Seventh, there should be a uniform provision defining commencement of an action sufficient to halt the running of the limitation period.
The £.ling of the complaint, which is the point of commencement of an
action under the federal rules,394 might be a desirable point for halting
the running of the statute, since this should indicate a timely assertion
of the claim against the defendant. However, perhaps actual service
or notice to the defendant should be required within a relatively short
time in order that he can effectively marshal and preserve his evidence.
Eighth, the manner of invoking the bar of the statute should be
provided for, preferably as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant to the individual cause of action. 395
Ninth, barred contract claims, or claims involving ·a sum certain in
money, should be revivable by payment, acknowledgment or a new
promise by the defendant. Such conduct should be considered as raising a new obligation which should be sued on as such. 396 Since the
statute should be applied to joint defendants individually, any such payment, acknowledgment or promise by one joint defendant should not
392 Except perhaps if it is a claim which would be the subject of compulsory counterclaim under a court rule similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a).
393 This should eliminate the need of harking back to old practice forms and rules to
ascertain whether the action is legal or equitable in nature. To phrase the statute of limitations in terms of relief sought makes concern with old practice unnecessary.
394 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3.
,
395 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). Cf. Rule 9(f) and see 63 HARv. L. fulv.
1198 (1950).
396 Under a substantive approach to the statute of limitations this would seem necessary
if the old right was completely extinguished by the original bar of the statute.

1951]

999

LIMITATIONS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

affect the protection of the bar of the statute enjoyed by any other joint
defendant.
Finally, from a practical standpoint a borrowing provision should be
included. If the uniform statute of limitations should receive non-uniform treatment by the judiciary, or if it should not be adopted in all
jurisdictions, if it should not be passed in its entirety, or if it should have
special local limitation provisions engrafted onto it, such a provision
would eliminate shopping by a plaintiff to take advantage of such local
peculiarities.
Though as a practical matter it is difficult to secure passage of uniform legislation in all states, particularly when the subject matter has
so long been considered as of local interest only, the need for such legislation in the case of the statute of limitations seems clear. To the extent that such a statute is adopted, the problem of varying limitation
periods upon particular causes of action and similar causes of action
will be removed. Only by a uniform state treatment of the problem will
the conllict among federal districts resulting from the uniformity of result
requirement of Erie Railroad 11. Tompkins be resolved.

APPENDIX
ANALYSIS OF GENERAL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
A.

TIME LIMITATIONS
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Formal Contracts
I. Contractual provisions of deeds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Bonds
a. Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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c. Fiduciary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Recognizances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Negotiable instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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II Informal Contracts
l. Accounts
a. Stated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Other obligations to pay money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Written contracts in general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Unwritten contracts in general
a. Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. hnplied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Breach of promise to marry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Contracts in general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.9

1.4

5.4

4
4
4
4
7
4
4
4
1
6
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I

Number
[ Av~rage
of
m
states
years

I

Mean

in

years

ill Non-Contractual Obligations to Pay Money
I. Quasi-contract ..............................
2. Statutory liability
a. Penalty or forfeiture
(1) Person aggrieved
(2) Person prosecuting ....................
(3) State or county .......................
(4) In general ...........................
b. Federal or state wage statute .................
c. Usury
d. Other
3. Judgment
a. Action on judgment
(1) Court of record
(a) United States ....................
(b) This state .......................
(c) Other states .....................
(d) All states .......................
(2) Courts not of record
(a) This state ........................
(b) Other states .............. -- .....
(c) All states .......................
(3) In general
(a) United States ....................
(b) This state ......... .... --- .....
(c) Other states
(d) All states
b. Judgment deemed satisfied ..................
c. Execution and revival. .....................
4. Other obligation .............................
•

•

••

■

••••

•••••

■

■

■•

■

••••••••••

•••••••••••

■•

,

■

••••••

••••••••••

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

--

■

••••••••••••

•••••••••••

---

■

---

■

•••••

•••••••

3

1.7

1

12
22
19
28
18
4
25

2.4
1.2
1.8
1.9
1.8
1.5
4.5

3
I
2
2
2
I
3

3
6
5
2

1.5
16.0
9.3
15.0

10
20
7

2
I
8

6.0
4.0
6.5

6

17
7
16
14
8
11
8

10.0
11.6
7.6
10.4
14.1
7.6
5.6

10
10
6
10
10
7
5

3
2
10
15

20.7
30.0
21.8
14.0

20

4
9

27.5
11.8

20
10

21
12

II.I
19.0

10
10

22
16
16
3
7
6
6
44

13.4
1.0
13.3
4.3
3.6
5.8
4.4
13.1

10
I
10
4
3
5
5
10

IV Real Property
I. Recover of land or possession
a. By state or other municipal corporation
(1) Against adverse possessor
(a) Color of title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Bare possess_ion
Cc) In general .......................
(2) Against other person ...................
b. By grantee of state
(1) Against adverse possessor ...............
(2) In general ...........................
c. By other persons
(1) Against adverse possessor
(a) Color of title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Bare possession ..................
(c) In general
(i) Entry or action after accrual ...
(ii) Action on entry ..............
(iii) In general ..................
(2) Against state ......... , ...............
(3) Against purchaser of tax title ....... , ....
(4) Against purchaser at execution sale .......
(5) Against purchaser from estate ............
(6) Against other person ............. _ .....
•

■

•••••••••

--

••••••

20
10
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I

N~ber

2. Injury to land. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Enforcement of liens
a. Foreclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- E.-...:tension by filing. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Deficiency judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Rents, use and profits
a. By state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. By other person...........................
5. Specific performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Forcible entry and detainer
a. Forcible entry and detainer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Forcible entry only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

states

I

Average
in
years

Mean
in
years

44

4.3

3

18
12
12
3

13.0
16.2
8.6
@.8

10
15
7
1

11
20

5

21.5
6.8
11.3

20
6
5

5
5

1.7
1.8

2
2

39

4.2

4

31
33
12
39
5

4.1
4.3
2.7
4.0
5.0

4
4
2
3
6

34

1.8

2

6
36
1
13
14
12
1

1.3

1

1.8
3.0
1.8
1.5
3.5
1.0

2

40
41
9
15
16
39

1.5
1.4
1.7
1.2
1.8
2.9

5
2
3

5.6
8.0
7.0

5
3

8.4
2.0

6
1

3
1
13
2

4.5
5.0

5

~-4

6

V Personal Property
1. Recovery of possession..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Claim for damages
a. Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Detention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI Persons
1. Assault and battery.. . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Imprisonment
a. Arrest . .. . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
b. False imprisonment.......................
c. Habeas corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Wrongful death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Seduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Criminal conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Alienation of affections.. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .
7. Injury to character
a. Libel .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..
b. Slander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. In general .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .
8. Malicious prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Malpractice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Injury to persons in general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII Trusts and Estates
1. Trusts
a. Establishment and enforcement..............
b. Misconduct of trustee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Recovery of corpus from trustee. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Decedents' estates
a. Establishment and probate of will. . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Contest of will. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Claim against estate
(1) Accruing before death..................
(2) Accruing after death............. . . . . . .
(3) In general ............... _ . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Misconduct of representative.................
3. Guardianship
a. Misconduct of guardian. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
2

5.5
5.0
6.0

2

1
2

1
1
2

1
2
2

5
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I
.

VIII Business Associations
1. Corporations
a. By corporation
(I) Against officer or shareholder. . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Against other person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. By other person
(I) Against corporation
(a) Injury to person.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Injury to property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Against officer or shareholder............
2. Partnerships
- Settlement of accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

N~ber
states

I

Avfuge
yeaxs

I

z..tan
yeaxs

l
3

6.0
2.0

2

l
4
6
12

1.0
2.3
6.3
4.3

l
2
3

4

5.0

5

6

8.5

5

3

7

4.3
3.5

2
3

l
l

5.0
3.0

3·
3
4
4
6

0.3
0.3
0.6
8.0
0.8

0.3
0.2
0.8
6.0
1.0

1
7
13

6.0
0.8
2.1

l
l

26
16
16
12

3.0
3.0
3.1
3.0

3
3
3
3

19
12

2.9
2.8
2.6
6.1

3
3
3
3

5

0.8

l

16
16

1.2
1.2

l
l

28
9

4.0
3.3

4
3

IX Municipal Corporations
1. State

a. By state . ....... ····· ....................
b. Against state
(I) For money .............. ········· ...
(2) In general ...........................
2. Other municipal corporation
a. By municipal corporation
(I) For money ...........................
(2) In general ...........................
b. Against municipal corporation
(I) Contesting election ....................
(2) Contesting bond issue ..................
(3) Contesting tax assessment ...............
(4) Enforcement of bond or other obligation ...
(5) Injury to person .......................
(6) Injury to property
(a) Real property ................ : ...
(b) In general ........... ········· ...
(7) In general ...........................

X Public Officers
1. Misc$nduct
a. Sheriff or deputy ..........................
b. Constable ...............................
c. Coroner . ................................
d. Other officer ........................ --- ..
2. Non-payment of money collected
a. Sheriff or deputy .•.......... , .............
b. Constable ............ -- --- ...............
c. Coroner
d. Other officer .............................
'
3. Improper seizure or detention of money or property
Officer or de facto officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Escape of prisoner arrested on civil process
a. Sheriff or deputy ..........................
b. Other officer .............................
■

••

■

----·····

---

••••••

---

.........

-

14
14

XI Fraud and Mistake
I. Fraud .............. ······ .................
2. Mistake ....................................
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I
XII Actions Not Otherwise Limited
I. All other personal actions ......................
2. Actions of trespass except
a. Assault and battery ........................
b. False imprisonment ........................
c. InjUIY to person ...........................
3. Actions on case except
a. Slander
b. Libel
c. InjUIY to person ...........................
d. Account between merchants .................
4. All other actions .............................
•

••

B.

■

••••••••••••••••••••

••

■

•••

·-

■

•••••••••••

••••••••••••••••••••••••

I Av1crage
years

Mean
in
years

13

5.2

4

1
1
1

6.0
6.0
4.0

4
3
2
1
31

6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
7.0

Number
of
states

lll

6
6
6

5

SUSPENSION AND EXTENSION OF STATUTORY PERIOD
Extension
i----(-1)_:___
(_2_)_•___(_3_)_•-

I

Suspension•

I Disability of Plaintiff
I. Infancy
a. Actions concerning land ....... .
b. Other actions ............... .
c. All actions ................. .
2. Insanity
a. Actions concerning land ....... .
b. Other actions ............... .
c. All actions ................. .
3. Imprisonment
a. Actions concerning land ....... .
b. Other actions ............... .
-c. All actions ................. .
4. Other disabilities
a. Actions concerning land ....... .
b. Other actions ............... .
c. All actions ................. .
5. All disabilities
a. Actions concerning land ....... .
b. Other actions ............... .
c. All actions ................. .

Il Absence of Defendant
I. Absence at time of accrual ........ .
2. Absence after accrual ............ .
3. Concealment at time of accrual .... .
4. Concealment after accrual ........ .
5. Absence in general .............. .
6. Concealment in general. . . . . . . . . . . ·
1

6.9 (33)"
1.9 (14)
1.8 (6)

(4)"
(21)
(5)

24.8 (II)"
14.2 (5)
15.0 (3)

(2)"

6.9 (33)
1.9 (14)
1.8 (6)

(3)
(21)
(5)

24.8 (IO)
10.0 (IO)
15.0 (3)

(2)

7.5 (26)
1.8 (12)
1.8 (4)

(3)
(16)
(3)

25.0 (6)
5.2 (5)
13.3 (3)

7.2 (9)
1.6 (4)
1.0 (I)

(I)
(6)

27.5 (2)

4.7 (3)
2.2 (3)
2.0 (2)

5.0 (I)

(2)
(1)

2.0 (1)
(1)
(36)
(1)
(11)
(9)

Average years for bringing action after removal of disability.
2 States permitting full statutory period after removal of disability.
• Average maximum time allowed after accrual of claim.
• States suspending operation of the statute during condition.
• Number of states having such a provision indicated in parenthesis.

(4)
(40)
(12)
(2)
(3)
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· 1--(-l_)_-,--E_~-;-)s_io_n-:----(3)
III Death
1. Death of plaintiff ............... .
2. Death of defendant ............. .
3. Death of either party .......... .'..
4. Representative deemed qualified ... .

1.0 (31)
1.1 (27)

II

Suspension

3.0 (1)
5.0 (4)

(1)
(5)
(7)

5.0 (I)

4.2 (5)

IV War
1. Enemy plaintiff ................ .
2. Enemy either party ............. .
3. Serviceman .· .................. .

1.0 (I)

(8)
(14)
(4)

V Insolvency and Arbitration
I. Duration of insolvency proceedings ..
2. Duration of arbitration proceedings.

1.0 (I)

(3)
(2)

VI Prevention or Failure of Action
1. Prevention
a. Statutory prohibition against commencement ... -- .... --· ...
b. Injunction staying commencement
c. Other interference
(1) Fraudulent concealment ...
(2) Other methods ..........
2. Failure
a. Reversal of plaintiff's judgment.
b. Arrest of plaintiff's judgment ....
c. Failure of process or service .....
d. Defeat of writ or action
(1) Death of party ...........
(2) Matter of form ...........
(3) Other matter ............
e. Effect of proceedings on defendant's cause used as counterclaim
or defense ................

C.

1.0 (I)

1.0 (1)
.1.0 (1)
4.0 (5)
1.0 (1)

5.0 (1)
5.0 (1)

(20)
(26)

(6)

1.1 (39)
1.0 (18)
1.0 (9)

(4)
(5)
(2)

1.3 (16)
0.9 (8)
1.0(23)

(1)

0.5 (1)

(4)

DEFINITIONS AND RULES FOR APPLYING STATUTE OF LThnTATIONS

I

Number
0£
states

I Applicability of State Statutes
1. Persons and causes
a. Claims by state
(I) Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Claims against state
Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Claims by other municipal corporation
·
(1) Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Does not apply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Claims against other municipal corporation
Applies ........................................... , .
e. Claims against nomesidents
(I) Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19
10
I
3
5
1
3
1
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states

£. Claims against fiduciaries
Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
g. Accounts between merchants
Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
h. Bills, notes and other evidences of debt
(I) Of banks and other corporations
Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) In general
Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i. Claims for equitable relief
(a) Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
j. Counterclaim
(a) Applies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Does not apply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
k. Inapplicable to claim barred prior to statute................. . . . .
1. Inapplicable to claim specially limited. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
m. Inapplicable to actions already commenced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
n. Inapplicable to amendment of cause
Unless arising from different transaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
o. Where applicable to fiduciary also ?-PPlicable to beneficiary. . . . . . . . .
p. Where applicable to indebtedness also applicable to security. . . . . . . .
q. Applicable to all civil actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Applicable to special proceedings of a civil nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
s. Applicable to joint defendants individually. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Effect of contracts and wills
a. Contracts altering time limitations void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Contracts shortening time limitations void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Will providing for payment of barred claims ineffective unless intent
clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II "Arising" or "Accrual" of Claim6
1. Account
a. Mutual, open and current
(I) Where demands are mutual and reciprocal
(a) At last item proved on adverse side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Atlast item proved on either side.....................
(2) In general
(a) Atlast item proved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) At last item proved on either side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Atlast transaction or payment........................
b. Bank deposit
At demand..........................................
2. Statutory penalty or forfeiture
a. Against corporate director or stockholder
At discovery of facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Against other person
- At discovery of facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Real Property
a. Recovery of title or right of entry
(1) At disseisin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) At death of predecessor seised or possessed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4
3
10
3
4
2
15
6

12 ·
24
6

1
2
4
21
6

14
5
3
3

2
16
12
1
5
4

11
2

6
6

• In addition, one finds accrual provisions in from one to three states covering matters such as deed
covepants, bonds, judgments, wrongful death, establishment or contest of will, property held by fiduciaries, charges of carriers, agency and partnership.
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states

(3) At termination of intermediate estate........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
( 4) At forfeiture or breach of condition for which benefit sought. . . .
(5) At time ancestor or predecessor first gained right to title or possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(6) At any other time when claimant became entitled to entry or
possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Action for waste or trespass
At discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Fraud and mistake
a. Relief for fraud
At discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Relief for mistake
At discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~

N

V

Co=encement of Action
I. Action deemed commenced
a. Filing of complaint or petition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Filing of complaint or petition and issuance of summons or process. .
c. Issuance of summons or process ..... '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
d. Service on defendant.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
e. Service on defendant or co-defendant who is joint contractor or otherwise united in interest with defendant........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f. First publication, if regularly continued. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Attempted service equivalent to service
·
a. In court of record
(1) If delivered with intent it be served to sheriff of county where
defendant last resided or defendant corporation last did business
(2) Where actual service made within 60 days. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(3) Where first publication within 60 days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. In court not of record
.
(1) If delivered to officer, authorized to serve process, of city or town
where defendant resided or defendant corporation last did
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) If actual service obtained with due diligence........... . . . . .
c. In general
(1) If party faithfully and diligently attempts to procure service....
(2) When delivered to officer with intent it be served........... .
(3) Where actual service within 60 days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
( 4) Where first publication within 60 days. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Manner of Invoking Statute
I. Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Demurrer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Any proper manner of raising issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Effect of Bar on Joinder of Parties
- Non-joinder of one jointly liable is not objectionable when claim against
him is barred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

VI Effect of Payment, Acknowledgment ·or New Promise
I. Action may be revived by acknowledgment 'or promise in writing signed
by person to be charged. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Action may be revived by part payment on principal or interest by person
to be charged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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I
3. No indorsement of payment on note, bill or other writing deemed sufficient proof of payment......................................
4. No promise or acknowledgment signed by joint contractor deprives other
joint contractor of benefit of statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. No payment by joint contractor affects rights of other joint contractors. . .
6. Admission, act or acknowledgment of partner after dissolution affects only
himself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. After promise or acknowledgment, plaintiff sues:
a. On original cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. On either original cause or new promise or acknowledgment. . . . . . . .
VII

Disabilities
1. Disabilities of plaintiff must exist at accrual or arising of claim. . . . . . . . .
2. Successive disabilities may not be tacked. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. When two or more disabilities co-exist, all must be removed before limitations attach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VIII Applicability of Statutes of Other States
I. No action allowed in this state if barred:
a. Where it accrued. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. Where it accrued and defendant resided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Where defendant resided...................................
d. Where it accrued and all parties resided. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. No action allowed in this state if barred where it accrued, except in favor
of resident of this state holding it from accrual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Where action on judgment barred where rendered, no action allowed in
this state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. If action on contract barred where entered into, no action allowed in this
state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
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